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STATE ENERGY CARTELS
James W. Colemant

Frackinghas made America the center of global oil production and the engine
world's economy. But haste makes waste. America's new oil wells are releasing
the
of
naturalgas as well, which is prized as a clean and reliablefuel aroundthe world but
must be simply burned off or "flared",if there are no pipelines to bring it to the
customers that need it. The pace of the oil boom and the challenges of building new
pipelines have forced oil companies to flare staggering quantities of naturalgas.
Texas and North Dakota are now flaring-that is, wasting-more gas than many
states or even nations consume. This Article shows that to stop this economic and
environmental waste, states must develop a new approachto antitrustlaw. It makes
the casefor state energy cartels.
One of the few consensus groundsfor regulationis preventingabuse of market
power-preventing dominant suppliersfrom increasingtheir profits by selling less
at higher prices. States break up producer cartels so that competition provides
consumers with lower prices. But what happens when a state's interestcoincides with
producers rather than consumers? The economic health of major energy exporters
depends on the price of the products they export. That is, these states, provinces, and
countries can benefit by increasingthe price of the oil and gas. For the first half of
the twentieth century, the United States was the world's premier oil exporter; during
that time, U.S. states cooperatedas a defacto cartel to ensure higher oil prices. When
other countries overtook the United States as the world's top oil producers, they
formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to play a
similarrole.
This Article explains how state cartels offer the best solution to the flaringcrisis
and a unique opportunity for productive global cooperation to address climate
change. It shows how states can slow production, protect the environment, and
increase their industries' profits by adapting and perfecting tools that the United
t Associate Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law. Special thanks to Hillel Bavli, Karen
Bradshaw, Jennifer Collins, Monika Ehrman, Ryan Koopmans, Sharon Jacobs, Alexandra Klass,
John Lowe, Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, Josh Macey, Nathan Richardson, Paul Rogers, Ann
Schwarz, Daniel Sokol, David Spence, Fenner Stewart, and Shelley Welton for helpful comments.
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States stumbled upon in the first half-century of oil production. And it shows how
these tools can be tailoredto protect consumers, industry, and the environment.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................
I.

THE THEORY OF STATE CARTELS ..................................................................... 2240

A.

The Casefor State Cartels.................................................................... 2241
1. The Costs and Benefits of Monopoly...................................... 2242
2.

II.

2234

When Cartels Serve the State Interest..................................... 2245

B.

How States Optimize Oil and Gas Production Rate .......................... 2247

C.

When State Oil and Gas Cartels Work ............................................... 2249

STATE ENERGY CARTELS, HERE AND ABROAD ................................................ 2252

A.

The RailroadCommission and the Oil Compact............................... 2252

B.

The Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries........................ 2260

C.

Nascent North American Cartels......................................................... 2263

III. U.S. ENERGY CARTELS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.............................................. 2268

A.

Reforming the Railroad Commission and the Compact Commission
................................................................................................................ 2269

B.

Other Approaches to Reducing FlaringWill Not Work .................... 2273

C.

LimitingHarm to Oil and Gas Consumers ........................................ 2275

D. Slowing Carbon Emissions From Oil and Gas ................................... 2276
E.

Increasingthe EnvironmentalBenefits of Natural Gas..................... 2278

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 2280

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to exaggerate the power of OPEC, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, which coordinates production of oil by

many of the world's leading exporters. The world's economies tremble
in anticipation of its every communique. When OPEC restricts

production, world oil prices rise; and when oil prices rise, the global
economy suffers. Since World War II, all but one U.S. recession was
preceded by rising oil prices.1

1 James D. Hamilton, HistoricalOil Shocks 26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
16790, 2011); see also MICHAEL BRUNO & JEFFREY D.

SACHS,

ECONOMICS OF WORLDWIDE
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Why would these oil-producing countries conspire to cut oil

production? The answer is that OPEC is the world's most prominent
example of market power-the monopolist's ability to raise profits by
cutting production.2 In past decades, these countries together
controlled a large enough share of world production that when they cut
their production, prices rose enough to more than compensate them for
selling less oil.3 That is, what these countries lost in lower sales volume,
they more than made up for in higher sales prices.
But these oil behemoths are also different from a normal
monopolist in two ways. First, they are sovereign nations so they must
balance the interests of oil consumers in their country with their oil
producers' interest in high prices. Second, they are managing a longterm resource: their vast stores of oil wealth. They have to consider the
long-term value of this resource, ensuring that prices are high enough
that they do not run out of oil and simultaneously making sure prices
are low enough that alternatives such as ethanol and electric vehicles do
not become too attractive.
How rapidly should these countries produce oil? To answer this
delicate and fateful question, the OPEC cartel can rely on the field of
conservation economics, developed in the United States in the first half
of the twentieth century to manage its own oil wealth, which at the time
dominated world supplies.4 The short answer is that a country with
dominant market power should produce oil rapidly enough that the
price of oil is affordable but gradually and smoothly rises over time as

supplies dwindle.5
The United States, unexpectedly, is facing this momentous
question again because it is emerging from history's biggest oil boom,

STAGFLATION (1985) (showing how worldwide economic struggles in the 1970s were driven by
OPEC-driven oil price increases); VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY 346-47
(2017) (low oil prices "w[ere] a critical ingredient" of post-war expansion, which OPEC stopped
with higher oil prices); id. at 365 ("[A]ny decisions of a few individuals, particularly those in
Saudi Arabia whose enormous oil-production capacity dominated OPEC's directions, will have
profound consequences for global prosperity.").
2 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 937, 937 (1981); Eugene V. Rostow & Arthur S. Sachs, Entry into the Oil Refining Business:
Vertical Integration Re-Examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856, 905 (1952).
3 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 615-16

&

(1991); see also infra Section II.B.
4 In 1928, "the United States produced 68% of the world's" oil. J. Howard Marshall
Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production, 41 YALE L.J. 33, 33 n.2 (1931). In
1932, its share was sixty-two percent. Donald H. Ford, Controlling the Production of Oil, 30 MICH.
L. REV. 1170, 1170 n.l (1932).
5 See infra Section II.B.
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fracturing.6

This

combination of technologies, generally known as "fracking," has more
than doubled American oil production in just a few years and turned
the United States into one of the world's leading oil and gas exporters. 7
As an energy exporter, the United States will have to face the
central issue that has driven OPEC-what rate of production would

maximize the value of its vast, newfound oil and gas reserves? In fact, it
may find itself increasingly aligned with the oil-exporting countries in
OPEC, with the same interest in smoothing global production of crude
oil.8 That dynamic is already developing as the United States
increasingly works with Saudi Arabia to ensure that U.S. sanctions on
Iran do not disrupt global oil supplies.9 And it has accelerated as the
March 2020 collapse in global oil prices sparked U.S.-OPEC

negotiations on oil prices and production.o
As momentous as these oil questions are, there is an even more
pressing governance crisis: over-production of natural gas. Fracked oil
wells also produce "associated gas"-natural gas molecules that are
trapped together with the oil now being produced from shale rock
layers." These gas molecules are released along with oil when shale rock
6 See John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The FrackingRevolution: Shale Gas as a Case
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 968-74 (2015) (describing the fracking process);
James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 95 IND. L.J. 389, 418-19 (2020); Thomas
W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and
Water Contamination:A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 153-54 (2013).
7 James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV.
659, 676 (2019). The United States produces more oil and more natural gas than any other
country, has become a net oil exporter, and will soon be the world's biggest exporter of liquefied
natural gas. Javier Blas, The U.S. Just Became a Net Oil Exporterfor the First Time in 75 Years,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-06/u-sbecomes-a-net-oil-exporter-for-the-first-time-in-75-years [https://perma.cc/3VM5-B8Z3]; Gas
2019: Analysis and Forecasts to 2024, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, (June 2019), https://www.iea.org/
reports/gas-2019 [https://perma.cc/GR7K-SRVM].
8 See Timothy Puko & Rebecca Elliott, U.S. Considers Intervention in Saudi-Russia Oil
Standoff, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2020, 8:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considersintervention-in-saudi-russia-oil-standoff-11584636054 [https://perma.cc/57RS-8XV4].
9 Bernard L. Weinstein, The U.S. and OPEC Have Unwittingly Become Partners,
INSIDESOURCES (June 7, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/the-u-s-and-opec-haveunwittingly-become-partners [https://perma.cc/F5EN-UAB7] (As OPEC has fallen from fortythree percent of global production to thirty-one percent, "the United States and OPEC ... have
become partners with both sides understanding the benefits of stability in the oil market.").
10 See Timothy Gardner & Jennifer Hiller, U.S. to Send Envoy to Saudi Arabia; Texas Suggests
Oil Output Cuts, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-globaloil-usa-saudi-arabia/u-s-to-send-envoy-to-saudi-arabia-texas-suggests-oil-output-cutsidUSKBN2172YE (https://perma.cc/9CAA-YL2P].
11 David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 431, 438 (2013). Natural gas is mostly methane, the simplest
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is threaded by drilling horizontally and then hydraulically fractured.12
When this gas reaches the top of the wellhead, the oil company can
separate it from the crude oil and ship it by pipeline to natural gas
consumers. 13 But if there is not yet a pipeline to bring this natural gas
to markets, or if local markets are already over-supplied with gas, an oil
company considering drilling a new well faces a difficult choice. In
theory, it could wait to drill for oil until a pipeline is built for gas, but
oil companies typically need immediate oil production to pay the
14
rotating debt that finances their investments. Or it could drill the well,
15
sell the oil, and simply burn or "flare" off the gas. Oil companies in
Texas's Permian Basin and North Dakota's Bakken Shale are
increasingly drilling immediately, profiting from shale oil and flaring

off more and more associated gas. 16 By 2019, oil wells in each of these
formations were flaring more gas than many states consume; together

&

"hydrocarbon,"-i.e., a molecule made up of carbon and hydrogen atoms. It has just one carbon
atom and four hydrogen atoms. Crude oil is composed of longer hydrocarbon chains, generally
with six or more carbon atoms in a chain surrounded by fourteen or more hydrogen atoms. H.S.
BELL, AMERICAN PETROLEUM REFINING 15-17 (2d ed.1923). These longer, heavier hydrocarbon
chains are liquid at room temperature and pressure. Shorter hydrocarbon chains-with two,
three, four, or five carbons-are known as "natural gas liquids"; as their name indicates, these
intermediate molecules can be either a gas or liquid depending on temperature and pressure.
Coleman & Klass, supra note 7, at 681 n.119.
12 Spence, supra note 11, at 438-39; see James w. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines: Building
the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 275-76 (2019).
13 See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1009 (2015).
14 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 6, at 400; Note, Administrative Regulation of Petroleum
Production, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1142-43 (1946) (describing "need of some producers for a
speedy return on their drilling investments").
15 Oil can almost always be brought to market because, unlike gas, it can be shipped by many
methods including truck, rail, or barge. Coleman, supra note 12, at 272-73. Natural gas is flared
because venting it directly to the atmosphere is even worse for the global climate. Klass
Meinhardt, supra note 13, at 1009-10.
16 There are so many wells flaring in these formations that nighttime satellite images of the
United States show what seem to be massive cities in the sparsely populated oil-producing
regions of western Texas and North Dakota. Robert Krulwich, A Mysterious Patch of Light Shows
Up in the North Dakota Dark, NPR (Jan. 16, 2013, 1:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
krulwich/2013/01/16/169511949/a-mysterious-patch-of-light-shows-up-in-the-north-dakotadark?ft=3&f=111787346&sc=nl&cc=es-20130120 [https://perma.cc/WE37-WFMD]; Visualizing
(May 10, 2018),
the Oil Boom in the Permian Basin, POL. CALCULATIONS
https://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2018/05/visualizing-oil-boom-in-permian-basin.html
[https://perma.ccfV72A-HPRF]; see also Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 13, at 1009-15
(describing extensive flaring in North Dakota as a result of lack of transport options to bring
natural gas to markets in need of gas).

2238

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:6

these two formations are flaring more gas than is consumed by all 49
million people in Colombia.17
This tremendous economic and environmental waste is just a more
severe and localized version of the age-old oil exporter dilemma: a race
for production often fails to maximize the long-term value of the
hydrocarbon resource. Oil companies cannot solve this dilemma by
themselves. If a single oil and gas producer slowed its drilling, it would
do nothing to raise gas prices; it would only delay its profit from oil
production. But if oil companies tried to band together and slow
production so all companies could benefit from higher natural gas
prices, they would be criminally liable for price-fixing under the
Sherman Act.18
By contrast, states and nations have tools for maximizing the longterm value of their oil and gas resources. These tools were developed in
the United States in the first half-century of the oil industry when

17 Jennifer Hiller, Natural Gas FlaringHits Record High in First Quarter in U.S. Permian
Basin, REUTERS (June 4, 2019, 11:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shale-flaring/
natural-gas-flaring-hits-record-high-in-first-quarter-in-u-s-permian-basin-idUSKCN1T5235
[https://perma.cc/T9N6-6BZX] ("Together, the two oil fields on a yearly basis are burning and
venting more than the gas demand in countries that include Hungary, Israel, Azerbaijan,
Colombia and Romania, according to the report."); Shale Upstream Analytics, Permian Natural
Gas Flaring Exceeds 500 MMcfd in 4Q18, RYSTAD ENERGY (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2019/05/06/document-pm_02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MRNNHME] ("[N]atural gas flaring in the Permian basin reached an all-time high of approximately
530 MMcfd in the fourth quarter of 2018, driven by persistent gas takeaway capacity constraints
and increasing basin-wide gas production."); Brandon Evans, Gas Capture Issues Continue to
Prevent North Dakotafrom Setting Oil ProductionRecords, S&P GLOBAL (July 16, 2019, 9:20 PM),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/071619-gascapture-issues-continue-to-prevent-north-dakota-from-setting-oil-production-records
[https://perma.cc/GD8C-RU4S] (detailing challenges of building pipelines and hiring workers
quickly enough to use gas); Brandon Evans, North Dakota OperatorsFlareRecord 671 MMcf/d of
NaturalGas in July, S&P GLOBAL (Sept. 16, 2019, 8:26 PM), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/
market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/091619-north-dakota-operators-flare-record-671mmcf-d-of-natural-gas-in-july [https://perma.cc/K8YH-ASZF]. It is possible that even more gas
than this is being flared. Katherine Ann Willyard & Gunnar W. Schade, Flaring in Two Texas
Shale Areas: Comparisonof Bottom-Up with Top-Down Volume Estimatesfor 2012 to 2015, 691
ScI. TOTAL ENVT. 243, 243 (2019) (finding that satellite-based measures show twice as much
flaring as Texas reports for 2012-2015).
18 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per
se." (emphasis added)); John C. Peppin, Price-FixingAgreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law, 28 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1940); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). For a
description of criminal prosecutions under this statute, see JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE
FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 360 (2013).
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American oil ruled the world.19 These tools fell into disuse in the past
half-century as the United States became a net-energy importer,
identifying its interests with consumers in need of cheap energy and not
with producers looking to prop up the value of their goods.20 Now, as
history's biggest commodity boom returns America to its place as a
leading global energy exporter, the United States must adapt these old

tools to ensure maximum benefit from the new boom.21
This Article shows how the nation and its fifty states can maximize
the long-term benefit from the unprecedented oil and gas boom by
minimizing environmental and economic waste. It examines antitrust
law from a novel angle, showing what happens when the state's interest
22
is aligned with producers rather than consumers. It develops the
theory of state cartels, showing how jurisdictions can maximize the
long-term value of their natural resources by slowing production and
banding together with other producing jurisdictions. And it shows how

this novel theory both increases the economic value and decreases the
environmental cost of energy production and could be employed to
address the nation's crisis of natural gas flaring.
This Article also shows why state cartels create a unique
opportunity to harness the self-interest of the world's oil and gas
superpowers to slow global climate change. State cartels increase the
profits of oil and gas producers, but they also dramatically slow
production and use of fossil fuels. If the United States can use its new

dominance of global energy to coordinate production cuts that raise
global oil and gas prices, it will increase cash flow to Saudi Arabiah,
Russian, and American oil companies, while making concrete progress
on climate change and encouraging cleaner technology.
Even if U.S. states only cut back production enough to stop flaring,
they can still win huge environmental benefits. Natural gas burns much
more cleanly than dirtier fuels, such as oil and coal, that provide heating

19 See J. Howard Marshall & Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production:
Two Years of Proration, 42 YALE L.J. 702, 702-26 (1933) (describing history of state production
limits); Thomas W. Shelton, The Police Power Versus Property Rights, 7 VA. L. REV. 455 (1921).
20 See infra notes 135-45; YERGIN, supra note 3, at 664.
21 See infra notes 184-214; Blas, supra note 7.
22 Other scholars have noted the tensions between antitrust law's focus on increasing output
and environmental conservation's focus on restricting output. BRUCE YANDLE, CTR. FOR
PRIVATE CONSERVATION, ANTITRUST AND THE COMMONS: COOPERATION OR COLLUSION?,

(1997), https://cei.org/studies-issue-analysis/antitrust-and-commons-cooperation-or-collusion
[https://perma.cc/4CLL-ZAJQ]. This Article shows why states may have an economic interest in
enforcing cartels and how that interacts with their policies to protect the environment and their
consumers.
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and power to much of the world.23 When natural gas is flared at the well,
it is just an environmental liability. If natural gas can be saved and
transported to the markets that need it to replace oil and coal, it will be

an environmental asset, providing cleaner air around the globe.
The argument unfolds as follows. Part I explains the economic
theory of state energy cartels-showing why exporting states can profit
more by producing less energy and explaining how they can optimize
the pace of production. Part II unearths the history of state oil cartels,
showing how, at first, states such as Texas, and then later, OPEC and
Saudi Arabia, worked to moderate the pace of oil extraction. Part III
explains how the Texas Railroad Commission and the Interstate Oil and
Gas Compact Commission, a product of the first U.S. oil boom, can
resume their crucial role and work to limit natural gas flaring,
increasing the economic benefit from America's huge oil and gas
bounty. Part III also explains how its proposal secures significant
environmental benefits, provides a unique opportunity for global
cooperation on climate change, and prepares the United States for its

future as an oil exporter.
I.

THE THEORY OF STATE CARTELS

Breaking up monopolistic cartels is one of the fundamental
justifications for the modern regulatory state. 24 A cartel that can
coordinate to lower production will do so to raise prices above the
marginal cost of production, so that it can make more money even as it
sells less.25 This output restriction means consumers must pay more
23 Rana Sabouni, Hossein Kazemian, & Sohrab Rohani, Carbon Dioxide Capturing
Technologies: A Review Focusingon Metal Organic Framework Materials (MOFs), 21 ENV'T SCI.
& POLLUTION RSCH. 5427, 5428 (2014) (burning gas emits just 56% the carbon dioxide of coal
and almost no air pollution-just 0.04% the sulfur dioxide and 0.3% the particulate matter).
24 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 38-39 (6th ed. 2011); Andrei
Shleifer, UnderstandingRegulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 439, 440 (2005) (describing the "public
interest theory of regulation," "the cornerstone of modern public economics," which is premised
on two "market failures"-"monopoly or externalities"); Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll,
Regulation in Theory and Practice:An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 10 (Gary
Fromm ed., 1981) ("Because economic theory is firm in concluding that monopolies create
economic inefficiency, social intervention to prevent, undo, or control monopoly is potentially
attractive."). See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW (1996).

25 Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375, 375 n.2 (1965) (explaining that the fundamental evil forbidden
by the "rule of reason" in antitrust law is "reducible to restriction of output"). Even the most
skeptical viewers of antitrust law take a hard line against cartels. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits
of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 3, 20 (1984). ("Enforcement of the rule against naked horizontal
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money to producers and reduces the economy's efficiency by pricing

out customers who would be happy to buy goods at their cost of
production.26 But in the unusual case when a state produces much more
than it consumes, exporting commodities for consumers elsewhere, the
state's interests tend to align with producers. Its citizens get swept up in
the supply chain of commodity production as landowners,
manufacturers, investors, laborers, and service workers, so that they
benefit more from high prices than they lose from low prices. As a
result, the state may gain more from higher prices that make its
producers more profitable than it loses by harming its consumers or

reducing the efficiency of the economy.27
In this counterintuitive situation, the state can function somewhat
like a cartel, coordinating and constraining production of independent
producers to maximize their long-term profits. Such a cartel only works
when the state is a dominant producer in the commodity market or can
form an alliance with other major producing states. But dominant
producers are common within natural gas commodity markets because
transport constraints divide global markets into many smaller markets,
many of which are served by a dominant gas-producing state. These gas
markets are ripe for a rise of new state energy cartels.28
A.

The Casefor State Cartels

Monopolies have costs for consumers and the economy, but they

benefit producers. If a state is dominated by producers, a monopoly's
benefits may sometimes outweigh its costs. In these counterintuitive

circumstances, the maxims of antitrust and competition law are turned
on their head. To know when the state should allow, encourage, or even
enforce a cartel, it must measure and compare the costs and benefits of
monopoly.

restraints appears to be beneficial."). For this reason, the Supreme Court has referred to cartels
as "the supreme evil of antitrust." Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004); see also Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rise and (Potential)Fall
of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 471, 472 (2020).
26 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1989); Landes
& Posner, supra note 2, at 937, 954, 991-92; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
91-92 (1981). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
27 See infra Section I.A.1.
28 See infra Section I.A.2.
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The Costs and Benefits of Monopoly

In a competitive marketplace companies aim to sell as many items
as they can produce at a profit because their profits fall when they sell
less. "Market power," by contrast, is the ability of a dominant player, or
group of players, to raise its profits by cutting production-the
monopolist controls so much of the market that when it cuts production
and prices rise, it gains more from higher prices than it loses from fewer
sales.29 This price rise harms consumers, as can be seen in the standard
supply-and-demand charts contrasting efficient markets with a

monopoly.
Take the market for gasoline. Imagine an efficient market with an
equilibrium price of $3 a gallon. Low-cost producers and eager buyers
split the large surplus in the market. If a producer can make a gallon of
gasoline for $1 per gallon, it will make a profit of $2 per gallon. A more
marginal producer who can make a gallon of gasoline for $2.50 makes
$0.50 per gallon. The area between the supply curve and the equilibrium
price on the supply-and-demand chart shows this producer surplus.30
(See Figure 1.) Buyers get a big surplus from the market too: if a
consumer would have been willing to pay up to $7 per gallon, she
receives a surplus of $4 per gallon when she is able to purchase it for
just $3 per gallon. A more price sensitive consumer that would only
have been willing to pay $4 for a gallon gets a surplus of $1 per gallon.

The area between the demand curve and the equilibrium price shows
this consumer surplus.31

29 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 937 ("'[M]arket power' [is] ... "the ability of a firm (or
a group of firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many
sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded."); A. P. Lerner, The
Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
If a non-dominant seller, such as a single gas station, cuts its sales, it would have little impact on
market prices and any marginal rise in prices would mostly accrue to all the other sellers. Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 702-03 (1975).
30 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 134-38 (8th ed. 2018).
31 Id. at 139-41.
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Compeitive Gasoline Market

Price/Gallon

Demand

$7.50
$6.00

$4.50

-

Supply

Buyer's Surplus
$3.00

Competitive
Price

---

Seller5 Sumus
$1.50

0

I

I

I
Quantity Sold

Figure 1. Buyer and Seller Surplus in an Efficient Market
When a single seller takes over a market, however, it can win more
than the usual seller surplus by reducing production. So, imagine thata
single seller corners the gasoline market and cuts supply 25%. (See
Figure 2.) As buyers scramble to secure gasoline in this artificial
shortage, the equilibrium price rises sharply-imagine a rise from $3 a

gallon to $4.50 a gallon.
The monopolist receives higher prices for its product and lowers
its costs by shutting down its highest-cost production facilities. True, it
foregoes some marginal sales by restricting supply. If it kept operating
all the facilities that operated in the efficient market, it could turn a
small profit on running facilities that cost $2.50 a gallon to produce
gasoline for that $3 a gallon market. But the monopolist gains more
from higher prices and lower costs than it loses from forgoing a few
marginal sales. In other words, the area between its supply curve and
the market price has increased.32 (See Figure 2.) Accordingly, the buyer
surplus is reduced by higher prices-the area between the demand
curve and the market price has decreased.

32 If the monopolist restricted supply more, at some point it would lose more from reduced
sales than it would gain from higher prices. Areeda & Turner, supra note 29, at 701-02
(monopolist will restrict supply until its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost).
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Figure 2. The Effect of Monopoly: Higher Seller Surplus, Lower
Buyer Surplus, and Deadweight Loss
Absent distributional concerns, the main cost of monopoly is the
reduction in sales that results from the monopolist restricting supply to
marginal consumers. Although we often think of excess profits taken
from consumers as the problem of monopoly, the extra money that
consumers pay for gasoline goes to the monopolist, so at least someone
benefits.33 But the foregone gasoline sales are simply a deadweight

loss-no one benefits. If a seller could have produced a gallon of
gasoline for $2.50 and sold it for $3 to a consumer that would have been
willing to pay $4, then the seller would have been better off by $0.50 and
the buyer would have been better off by $1. When a monopolist restricts
supply to raise prices, this trade can no longer happen, and society is
poorer.34

33 Informal discussion of monopoly often focuses on how it raises consumer prices above the
competitive level. But from the perspective of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the high prices are not the
problem: less consumer surplus just means more producer surplus. See POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 91-92; J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON.
J. 696 (1939). The true deadweight loss is the supply restriction. When the monopolist raises
prices above the competitive level, it refrains from selling some quantity of goods at prices that
would benefit both consumer and producer.
34 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 954.
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Apart from this deadweight loss from foregone sales, most
politically responsive governments also share the consumer's
distributional preference for lower prices to ensure a large buyer
surplus. That is, the government usually favors lower prices to ensure
that consumers receive a reasonable share of the market surplus. So, in
practice, monopoly regulation often focuses on lowering prices as well

as increasing supply.35 Governments generally try to limit market power
by breaking up monopolies or prescribing the prices that monopolists
can charge.36
2.

When Cartels Serve the State Interest

Sometimes, however, the government is the monopolist. Almost
everywhere other than the United States, oil, gas, and other minerals
under private landowners' land are owned by the government, so higher
37
prices for oil and gas would maximize government revenue. Of course,
the government may benefit politically from lower prices for
consumers. 38 But if the government produces oil and gas for export to
consumers in other countries, it will prefer higher prices to extract more
39
revenue from those foreign consumers.
35 One situation in which these concerns diverge is discriminatory pricing. If a monopolist
can identify marginal consumers that are unwilling to pay the monopoly price but would"be
willing to pay more than its marginal cost of production, it can simply offer them a different
price. If the monopolist could identify each customer's willingness to pay, it could charge each
consumer nearly that price, and capture almost all surplus in the market. This would solve the
problem of deadweight loss. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 405 (2009) ("Perfect price discrimination, which
charges each buyer precisely how much each values the product, reduces consumer welfare
compared to a uniform monopoly price, but increases ex post total welfare, which includes the
welfare benefit to the seller of earning additional monopoly profits."). The only remaining issue
would be purely distributional: the company would have taken the surplus that, in an efficient
market, would be split with consumers. One sign that governments take these distributional
issues seriously are the wide-ranging laws that have been adopted to prevent price discrimination.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARv. L. REV. 917, 932 (2003)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)); George J. Stigler, Law or
Economics?, 35 J.L. & ECON. 455, 455-56 (1992).
. 36 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 94448 (1979); Shelley Welton, Graspingfor Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 594-95 (2018).
37 BERNARD F. CLARK, JR., OIL CAPITAL: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN OIL, WILDCATTERS,
INDEPENDENTS AND THEIR BANKERS 12 (2016).

38 And, of course, modern laws against monopoly had their birth in cutting down oil
monopolies on behalf of customers. RON CHERNOw, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER,
SR. 537-39 (1998).

39 Consistent with this prediction, energy exporters generally offer oil and gas at a lower price
to domestic consumers than to foreign importers. Thomas Sterner, Oil Products in Latin
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Even in jurisdictions like the United States, where private
landowners own most oil and gas and it is produced by private
companies,40 governments may enforce a cartel to raise oil and gas
prices.41 That is, individual states can and do control the overall rate of
oil production, so they can make all companies slow their oil production
simultaneously.42 If a state's companies, in aggregate, enjoy market
power, the state may raise their profits by forcing all companies to cut
back production to ensure higher prices.
If oil companies agreed among themselves to cut back production,
they would violate the Sherman Act, but industry compliance with state
limits on production does not. 43 The state may not simply authorize
companies to cooperate in raising prices as much as they like.44 But the
state may set its own production limits or even authorize industry-set
limits so long as these limits are "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy" and are "actively supervised."45

When would a state want to take advantage of its ability to enforce
a cartel to raise prices? Roughly, a state would want slower production
when its producers have more to gain from high oil prices than its
consumers and its economy have to lose. So, raising prices helps a state
when its producers gain so much from their increased surplus that it
more than makes up for the diminished surplus of its consumers. 46

America: The Politics of Energy Pricing, 10 ENERGY J. 25, 43 (1989); Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict
Clements, Kevin Fletcher, & Gabriela Inchauste, Issues in Domestic Petroleum Pricing in OilProducingCountries 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/140, 2002) ("Domestic price
controls are prevalent, especially in countries that are net exporters of oil.").
40 Monika U. Ehrman, One Oil and Gas Right to Rule Them All, 55 HOuS. L. REv. 1063, 106465 (2018).
41 John C. Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1208-10 (1948);
Wm. E. Colby, The Law of Oil & Gas: A Consideration of Landowners' Rights, Particularlyas
Developed in California,31 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 369 (1943); Coleman, supra note 6, at 410-11;
Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil Is King, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631, 1647-48 (2017).
42 See infra Part II. In fact, cartels are hard to hold together without government enforcement.
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 344-45
(1974).
43 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV.
131, 137-38 (2012).
44 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 ("[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it.").
45 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan,
J.)).
46 This is not possible to represent on a typical supply and demand chart such as Figure 2,
which pictures a closed market representing all consumers and producers; on such a chart, it is
mathematically impossible that restricting supply would increase the area of producer surplus
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Thus, even when the government does not own a country's oil, if
the country is an oil exporter, it may want to maximize the value of the
nation's oil when it believes its landowners and oil companies have
more to gain from high oil prices than its consumers have to lose. More
precisely, a government that seeks to maximize utility for its own
citizens will favor a cartel when gains to its producers outweigh the costs
to its consumers. In these circumstances, the valence of antitrust and
competition law is flipped on its head and a utility-maximizing
government may tolerate, sponsor, or even enforce a cartel or other
form of supply restriction.47
B.

How States Optimize Oil and Gas ProductionRate

When a state has an interest in sponsoring or enforcing an energy
cartel, it faces a second question: How much should it restrict supply?
This is a question that monopolies face every day. A monopoly will
restrict supply to maximize its producer surplus, regardless of the
impact on consumer surplus, or the increase in deadweight loss, but
mindful of the danger that huge profits could induce other producers
to compete with it.48 As a result, it will restrict supply, selling less at
higher prices, until further restriction would cost it more money from
lower sales than it would gain from higher prices.49 That is, it will cut
supply until the marginal revenue that it would lose from cutting
another unit is equal to its marginal cost of production.50

more than it would decrease the area of buyer surplus. In fact, deadweight loss means that
restricted supply lowers buyer surplus more than it raises producer surplus. To think about state
cartels with such a chart, the appropriate intuition is that an energy-exporting state captures
almost all of the increase in producer surplus area, but only a fraction of the consumer surplus
area because most consumers are in other states.
47 This is very different from other exceptions to normal antitrust theories such as natural
monopoly, which argue that monopoly can provide lower prices for consumers. RICHARD A.
POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION 1 (1991) (a natural monopoly occurs when
"the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm"). A
country enforcing a state cartel need not reduce the number of firms, and it is not looking to
lower prices for consumers; it is seeking to raise prices. A closer analogy would be Daniel Sokol's
suggestion that the government might favor cartels when higher prices redistribute wealth away
from rich consumers. See D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking the Efficiency of the Common Law, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 795, 829 (2019).
48 Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry in Monopoly Markets, 57 REv. ECON. STUD.
531 (1990). Of course, a monopoly may wish to consider consumer surplus and deadweight loss
to some extent for non-pecuniary reasons or to limit the costs it imposes, which could motivate
anti-monopoly regulation.
49 Areeda & Turner, supra note 29, at 701-02.
50 Id.
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For states managing oil and gas cartels, the question is more
complicated in two respects. First, the state must also consider its
consumers, so it will take reduced consumer surplus and deadweight
loss into account to the extent that they fall on consumers within the

state. Second, the state is managing a long-term, finite oil and gas
resource, so it must also consider how changing the rate of production
will change the value of this resource over time.

First, how should a net commodity-exporting nation balance the
interests of producers, consumers, and the economy? Like a monopoly,
it knows that restricting supply until marginal revenue equals marginal
cost would maximize its producers' surplus. But the state will also
consider consumer surplus to the extent that those consumers are
citizens, which means that it will not want to restrict supply as much as
a monopoly would. To maximize domestic surplus, it will want to
maximize its producers' surplus plus its consumers' surplus, restricting
supply somewhat but less than a monopoly would.

Another approach is to expressly distinguish domestic consumers
from foreign consumers, restricting exports only. This is the approach
taken by many oil producers in the developing world: making oil
available to domestic and foreign markets at different prices.sI In this
situation, the government could, in theory, restrict exports to the same
extent that its exporting industry would choose, maximizing producer
surplus from these exports. But all price discrimination is imperfectthere is some leakage between sets of consumers paying different
prices.52 For one thing, if foreign markets are paying higher prices,
domestic consumers will be tempted to illegally export fuel to benefit

from those higher prices.53
Second, how fast should a major oil and gas exporter extract and

export its finite resources? This question was urgent in the United States
in the years between the world wars, when it produced two-thirds of the
world's oil.54 An associate professor of mathematics at Stanford

51 Sterner, supra note 39, at 42-43.
52 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155
U. PA. L. REv. 635, 648 (2007) ("Perfect price discrimination is a practical impossibility .... ").
53 See FABBY TUMIWA, TARA LAAN, KERRYN LANG, & DAMON VIS-DUNBAR, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., A CITIZENS' GUIDE TO ENERGY SUBSIDIES IN INDONESIA 19 (2011)

(describing similar arbitrage in nations that subsidize domestic fuel sales-"retail price disparity
has increased fuel smuggling and illegal selling of subsidized fuel"). The challenge of maintaining
artificially different prices in different markets also arises in the contexts of trademarks for
exclusive distribution in certain markets. David A. Malueg and Marius Schwartz, Parallel
imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination, 37 J. INT'L ECON. 167
(1994).
54 Marshall & Meyers, supra note 4, at 33; Coleman, supra note 6, at 392, 397-98 (describing
U.S. dominance of oil production during this time period).
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University, Harold Hotelling, produced the answer in 1931: a
monopolist should produce more at first and less over time.55 To
understand this result, imagine that you held all the oil in the world in
a warehouse and could sell it whenever you wanted to: selling more oil
at first and less over time ensures that the price of oil rises smoothly
56
over time, in parallel with the overall growth rate of the economy. This
means low prices at first, which ensures that consumers find uses for oil
and also discourages consumers from finding alternative sources of
energy. 57
Hotelling showed that this price path strategy was optimal because
if oil prices rose slower than the overall economy, then a producer could
profit by simply selling more oil immediately and investing in the wider
economy.5 8 On the other hand, if oil prices were set to rise more rapidly
than the economy, then the producer could benefit by withholding
some oil and selling it later at higher prices.59 Thus, a rational oil
monopolist would ensure smoothly rising prices over time.60 This is the
logic that has driven the dominant oil powers over the past century of
oil production.
C.

When State Oil and Gas Cartels Work

Recall that a large producer can only increase its profits by
restricting supply when it has "market power"-when it controls so
much of the market that producing less increases prices enough ,to
outweigh the cost of fewer sales. No single state can exercise market
power in the world's oil market that connects our global oceans'
55 Harold Hotelling, The Economics of ExhaustibleResources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137, 138 (1931)
("[C]ertain technical conditions most pronounced in the oil industry lead to great wastes of
material and to expensive competitive drilling, losses which may be reduced by systems of control
which involve delay in production."); id. at 144 ("Consequently great forests of tall derricks rise
overnight at a cost of $50,000 or more each; whereas a much smaller number and a slower
exploitation would be more economic.").
56 Id. at 139 ("If a mine-owner produces too rapidly, he will depress the price, perhaps to
zero. If he produces too slowly, his profits, though larger, may be postponed farther into the
future than the rate of interest warrants.").
57 In particular, Hotelling's rule means that if alternative technology suggests that alternatives
to oil might be viable, lowering the long-term price of oil, prices should fall immediately, which,
not coincidentally, undercuts the competitiveness of alternative technology. Ujjayant
Chakravort, Andrew Leach, & Michel Moreaux, Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car?, 61 J.
ENv'T ECON. & MGMT. 281 (2011).
58 Jeffrey A. Frankel, The NaturalResource Curse:A Survey 6-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 15836, 2010), https://www.nber.org/papers/w15836.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3SS3-5NDA].
59 Id.
60 Hotelling, supra note 55, at 138.
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countless ports of call, because no country produces more than an
eighth of the world's oil.61 If Russia unilaterally cut its oil companies'
production by twenty percent, other countries would take advantage of
these higher prices by shipping more oil. The final result would be
slightly higher world oil prices but not enough to compensate Russian
companies for producing twenty percent less oil.
Oil and gas market power can still emerge in two ways. First,
enough producing states can band together to restrict supply, creating
an international cartel that can benefit all members by raising prices. As
explained in Part II of this Article, that is the path taken by OPEC over
the last half century; and OPEC is modeled on the United States'
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, which played the same
role in the middle of the twentieth century.62 When OPEC's share
diminished in recent years, it formed a temporary alliance with Russia
to cooperate in raising world oil prices.63 With the early 2020 fall in
global oil prices, there is now talk of coordinating production cuts

between the United States, OPEC, and Russia, which together dominate
global oil production.64
Second, transport constraints can isolate individual markets so
that local producers have market power within these local markets. This

is uncommon in oil markets because oil can be transported in so many
ways: by rail, truck, or ship.65 If prices are higher in one port, producers
in other ports will take advantage by shipping more oil until prices
roughly equalize.66 And shipping oil by tanker is cheap, so the price of
oil in port markets around the world generally stays in a range of, at
most, a few dollars.67 But at times there are still significant geographical

61 Coleman, supra note 6, at 398 n.49 ("Today, the world's biggest oil producers-Saudi
Arabia, the United States, and Russia-each only produce about twelve percent of the world's
oil.").
62 Marshall & Meyers, supra note 19, at 736-40 (describing why a single state cannot benefit
by cutting production but a coalition of states can); see infra Section II.A.
63 Rania El Gamal, Alex Lawler, & Olesya Astakhova, OPEC's Pact with Russia Falls Apart,
Sending Oil into Tailspin, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2020, 3:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usopec-meeting/opecs-pact-with-russia-falls-apart-sending-oil-into-tailspin-idUSKBN20TOY2
[https://perma.cc/67RP-Y89H].
64 Timothy Gardner & Jennifer Hiller, U.S. to Send Envoy to Saudi Arabia; Texas Suggests Oil
Output Cuts, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oilusa-saudi-arabia/us-to-send-envoy-to-saudi-arabia-texas-suggests-oil-output-cutsidUSKBN2172YE [https://perma.cc/4DCW-ZZG8].
65 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 13, at 950; Coleman, supra note 12, at 292.
66 Coleman, supra note 12, at 273.
67 JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43563, SHIPPING U.S. CRUDE OIL BY WATER: VESSEL
FLAG REQUIREMENTS AND SAFETY ISSUES (2014) (showing U.S. marine shipping costs at between
$1.20 and $6 per barrel). Transporting oil by pipeline is also affordable when pipeline capacity is
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differentials in oil prices, especially in landlocked markets when
pipeline capacity is constrained so that oil producers that cannot find
space on a pipeline must pay substantially higher prices to ship their
product by rail or truck.68 In these circumstances, one jurisdiction's oil
69
producers can, if they act in concert, exercise market power.
Significant geographic differentials are far more commonplace in
natural gas markets because gas is always expensive to transport-it can
70
only be moved by pipeline or as liquefied natural gas. Both of these
options require multibillion dollar facilities and years of regulatory
approvals, so marginal production may not be able to reach neighboring
markets for years.71 Even if two markets are connected by a relatively
inexpensive pipeline, they may act as separate markets for long periods
of time if the pipeline reaches capacity before a new pipeline can be
built.72 And even if there is adequate transport between two natural gas
markets, the high cost of shipping gas means that distant markets
always operate somewhat independently.73 As a result, if they are
allowed or compelled to act together, it is extremely common for one
jurisdiction's natural gas producers to have market power within their
local natural gas market.74

not constrained. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY 277 (2017) (pipelines

made possible by "seamless steel pipes" have "turnedoil into an affordable global commodity").
68 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 13, at 974, 974 n.167 ("Shipping crude oil by rail costs $10
to $15 per barrel (varying by destination); shipping via pipeline costs $5 per barrel."); James W.
Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport
Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 143 (citing U.S. Department of State analysis showing it
costs $8 more per barrel to ship oil by rail).
69 See infra Section II.C.
70 See Jacqueline L. Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1518 n.169 (1981) ("Gas is not easily stored above
ground and can be transported only by pipeline. Moreover, gas pipelines require large capital
investments and can be justified only if the pipeline owner has secure sources of supply under
long-term gas purchase contracts."); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1018 n.68 (1992).
71 Coleman & Klass, supra note 7, at 66-67 nn.100-01.
72 See Adebola S. Kasumu, Vivian Li, James W. Coleman, Jeanne Liendo, & Sarah M. Jordaan,
Country-Level Life Cycle Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Liquefied Natural Gas
Trade for Electricity Generation, 52 ENV'T SCI. & TECH. 1735, 1739 (2018) (showing a spike in
natural gas prices in Mexico in mid-2013 from under $5 per million British Thermal Units
(MMBTU) to over $15 per MMBTU while U.S. Gulf Coast prices remained low).
73 See id. at 1744; ANDY FLOWER & JANE LIAO, THE PRICING OF INTERNATIONALLY TRADED
GAS: LNG PRICING IN ASIA 1-3 (2012).
74 See infra Section II.C.
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STATE ENERGY CARTELS, HERE AND ABROAD

Although the theory of state cartels has, until now, remained
inchoate, states have, in practice, been enforcing and coordinating de
facto cartels since the beginning of the modern oil industry.75 OPEC is
the most famous example; its decisions have shaped the world economy
for the past half century.76 But the first state cartel was created by the
Railroad Commission of Texas in the 1930s, which then expanded to
coordinate with other states through the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission.77 Most recently, with even faster-shifting energy markets,
the Canadian province of Alberta has adopted short-term cartel
restrictions to make use of a case of temporary market power in its
landlocked oil markets.78 This new approach, combined with this
Article's theory of state cartels, could allow innovative jurisdictions to

flexibly use short-term restrictions to maximize the economic and
environmental benefits of their energy production.

A.

The Railroad Commission and the Oil Compact

The modern era began on January 10, 1901, when the Spindletop
well in Beaumont, Texas, blew out and doubled global oil production
overnight.79 As Spindletop's historical marker puts it: "On this spot, on
the tenth day of the twentieth century, a new era of civilization began."8o
At the dawn of the century, this gusher would fuel the automobiles,

75 FLOWER & LIAO, supra note 73, at 1-3.
76 Robert McNally, Commentary: Welcome Back to Boom-Bust Oil Prices, COLUM. CTR. ON
GLOB. ENERGY POL'Y (Dec. 2015). The Interstate Oil Compact Commission is, since 1991, now
known as the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission.
77 Id. The Interstate Oil Compact Commission is, since 1991, now known as the Interstate
Oil and Gas Compact Commission. See infra notes 120-27.
78 Province of Alberta, Order In Council No. 375, Curtailment Rules (2018),
http://www.gp.alberta.ca/documents/orders/Ordersin_Council/2018/1218/2018_375.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JF8-FRC6]; Michelle Bellefontaine, Alberta Premier Announces 8.7% Oil
Production Cut to Increase Prices, CBC (Dec. 2, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/
2252dmont/2252dmonton/alberta-premier-oil-differential-announcement-1.4929610
[https://perma.cc/T8R9-VWU5].
79 JUDITH WALKER LINSLEY, ELLEN WALKER RIENSTRA, & JO ANN STILES, GIANT UNDER THE
HILL: HISTORY OF THE SPINDLETOP OIL DISCOVERY AT BEAUMONT, TEXAS, IN 1901, at 3 (2002)
("[T]he first six gushers in the Spindletop field produced more oil per day than all the rest of the
fields in the world put together."); CLARK, supra note 37, at 52-54.
80 LINSLEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 216.
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trucking, railroad engines, electrification, and shipping that would

build the world we now share.8I
The problem of oil overproduction, however, first came to the fore
after the discovery of the East Texas oil field on October 5, 1930.82 By
the next summer, this single massive oil field was producing almost a
million barrels of oil per day-ten times as much as Spindletop and

forty-two percent of all U.S. production.83 At the same time, the
ongoing Great Depression was reducing demand for oil, so as Texas
production ramped up, the price of oil dropped further and furtherprices fell from $0.99 per barrel in October 1930 to $0.13 per barrel in
July 1931.84 By the end of the year a barrel-forty-two gallons of oils587
cost less than a dime.86 Some barrels sold for as little as two cents. This

was a massive waste of Texas's oil and the Railroad Commission of
Texas began a years-long struggle to conserve its long-term value.88
The Railroad Commission of Texas is economic history's most
important, and most poorly named, regulator. In 1917, the Railroad
81 SMIL, supra note 67, at 247-49, 276; Coleman, supra note 6, at 392. This boom was also
enabled by the oil and gas lease, which soon spread across the world to enable oil development.
Id. at 398-407. With apologies to President Butler, this lease-not the limited liability
corporation-proved to be the greatest legal invention of modern times. Theresa A. Gabaldon,
The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate
Shareholders,45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1398 (1992) (citing WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, 1 CYCLOPEDIA

OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917) (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, President
of Columbia University, 1911: "[I]n my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest
single discovery of modern times... .Even steam and electricity are far less important than the
limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.")).
82 DIANA DAVIDS HINTON & ROGER M. OLIEN, OIL IN TEXAS: THE GUSHER AGE, 1895-1945

170 (2002); Julia Cauble Smith, East Texas Oil Field, TEX. STATE HIST. ASS'N: HANDBOOK OF TEX.,
[https://perma.cc/7C4Bhttps://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/east-texas-oilfield
APGK].
83 Cauble Smith, supra note 82 ("By mid-summer of 1931 operators were producing
approximately 900,000 barrels of oil per day from about 1,200 wells."); U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
Petroleum & Other Liquids: U.S. Field Prod. Of Crude Oil (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/
[https://perma.cc/X64T-3WPW]
dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a
(detailing that the United States produced 2,332,000 barrels per day in 1931).
84 Northcutt Ely, Symposium, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas, 53 HARV. L. REV.
1070, 1072 (1940) (reviewing papers by ten authors and outlining the history of legislation
governing oil and gas production in nine of the oil states); Cauble Smith, supra note 82.
85 Since the early years of the industry, forty-two gallon barrels have been oil's standard unit
of measurement because Pennsylvania's early oil prospectors used extra whiskey barrels to store
their new oil wealth. YERGIN, supra note 3, at 12. Natural gas, by contrast, is measured in many
diverse units-such as cubic feet, cubic meters, metric tons, and British Thermal Units-in part
because transport constraints have, thus far, prevented a global market that might lead to
standard measures. See Section II.C.
86 DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION 26

(1981).
87 JAMES A. CLARK & MICHELT. HALBOUTY, THE LAST BOOM 151 (1972).

88 Id. at 19-40.
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Commission was given authority over pipelines because, like railroads,
they transport oil.89 In 1919, then, it seemed natural to give the
Commission authority to regulate oil production as well.90 In the years
that followed, it assumed a never-to-be-repeated control over the

world's economies. In 1931, the first full year of production from the
East Texas oil field, Texas production jumped to twenty-four percent of
world production.91 Texas maintained this dominant role for decades,
producing a quarter of the world's oil from 1931 to 1953.92 Nowadays,
the world's most dominant oil nations only produce about twelve
percent of world supply.93 No nation has ever approached the global
dominance that the State of Texas enjoyed during these crucial years
when the world's economy, and then the future of democracy itself,
hinged on Texas's oil wells.94
As East Texas oil field production ramped up in early 1931, the
Railroad Commission stepped in, trying to slow production to raise
prices for the benefit of all producers. The Railroad Commission
imposed limits on daily production in April 1931.95 These limits on how
much daily production is allowed, known as "allowable limits" or

89 Id. at 20.
90

Id.

91 For Texas production, see Historical Crude Oil Production and Well Counts, R.R. COMM'N
OF
TEX.,
https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-and-gas/research-and-statistics/production-data/
historical-production-data/crude-oil-production-and-well-counts-since- 1935
[https://perma.cc/NFA3-WTR4]. For earlier years, see U.S. Mineral Yearbooks. E.g., O.E.
KIESSLING, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., BUR. OF MINES, MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES:

1931 (1932) at A-65 (showing Texas production in 1930 and 1931). For U.S. production, see
Petroleum & Other Liquids: U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?
n=PET&s=MCRFPUS1&f=M
[https://perma.cc/8HMT-CGED]. For global production, see 2006 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. ANN.
ENERGY REV. 309 tbl. 11.5. For world production, see BOUDA ETEMAD & JEAN LUCIANI, WORLD

ENERGY
PRODUCTION:
1800-1985
(1998),
https://theshiftdataportal.org/energy#Oil
[https://perma.cc/L26D-HCEG]. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 8 '("Texas ... accounted for 40%
of the crude petroleum produced in the United States between 1935 and 1960.").
92 Id. Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1938) (noting that
Texas produced "about 40 per cent" of American oil in 1937 and concluding that "[t]he growing
dominance of Texas is the prevailing characteristic of the oil production problem, and hence of
the oil legislation").
93 Candace Dunn & Tim Hess, The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil
Producer, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/

todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053 [https://perma.cc/2XHX-2LMA].
94 Herbert Feis, The Anglo-American Oil Agreement, 55 YALE. L.J. 1174, 1174 (1946)
(describing how oil was essential to strategic thinking about the war effort with countries lacking
oil forced to "bargain or barter"for oil, leaving them "dependent on the will or bounty of others").
See generally ROBERT GORALSKI & RUSSELL W. FREEBURG, OIL & WAR: HOW THE DEADLY
STRUGGLE FOR FUEL IN WWII MEANT VICTORY OR DEFEAT (1987).
95 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 31.
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96
simply "allowables," serve two purposes. First, allowable limits

maximize the amount of oil that can ultimately be produced from the
underground reservoir, which would be damaged by too-rapid
pumping. 97 Second, allowable limits can raise prices for all producers if
they are imposed by a regulator that controls production from enough
98
producers to form a cartel with market power.
A federal court quickly struck down the Commission's new
allowables, holding that state law did not allow the Commission to set
limits to raise prices. 99 The court believed the Commission could set
limits to protect the oil reservoir itself from damage by a race to
production, but it rejected the notion of allowables to raise prices.OO The
Texas legislature added to the confusion by passing a law against waste
but simultaneously codifying the court's holding against limits to raise
prices.101
In the meantime, Oklahoma, with much less production at stake
and correspondingly less market power, decided it could not wait for
Texas to act; its Governor, Alfalfa Bill Murray, sent troops to close two
of the state's most productive oil fields until prices recovered to a dollar
per barrel.102 Thirty-seven East Texas oil companies sent a telegram
praising Governor Murray's "leadership and courage" and contrasted it

with the situation in Texas, where the Chamber of Commerce was
96 Id. at 30 ("[T]he fact is that prorationing is both a means of conservation and a stratagem
for price-fixing."); Coleman, supra note 6, at 410-11; Ely, supra note 84, at 1071-72; Bruce
Kramer, Conflicts Between the Exploitation of Lignite and Oil and Gas: The Casefor Reciprocal
Accommodation, 21 HOUS. L. REV. 49, 100 n.315 (1984); P.H. FRANKEL, ESSENTIALS OF
PETROLEUM: A KEY TO OIL ECONOMICS 20 (1969).

""

97 YERGIN, supra note 3, at 205 ("To dissipate gas through helter-skelter production was to
lose that essential pressure, and thus to leave large amounts of petroleum unrecovered
underground."); Coleman, supra note 6, at 396; Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and
Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (1952) (overdrilling caused "dissipation of native reservoir
energy").
98 Coleman, supra note 6, at 397-98. Early scholars often criticized this use of allowables as
"price fixing." Marshall & Meyers, supra note 19, at 755.
99 DAVIDS HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 82, at 184; MacMillan v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 51
F.2d 400, 405 (W.D. Tex. 1931) (holding that Texas law forbid "artificial forcing of prices by
governmental action, in co-operation with those in the oil industry interested in raising prices").
This was actually the second time within a year that the Railroad Commission had tried to
restrain production and been rebuffed by the courts. CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 151.
100 Ely, supra note 92, at 1220; Coleman, supra note 6, at 396 (explaining why "too many wells
or extracting too quickly can mean producing less oil overall" as "reservoir pressure drops" and
"too much water may become mixed into the oil[,]" which, given the expense of removing it,
"may no longer be worth producing"); Note, supra note 14, at 1142 ("Poor production methods
and excessive production rates, through dissipation of reservoir energy and drowning of oil strata
by water encroachment, result in leaving a large percentage of oil inert in the ground with
recovery possible only at prohibitive cost.").
101 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 31.
102 CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 166.
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begging the Governor to impose martial law to limit production.103 Of
course, the companies could not simply agree to cut production
themselves-that would be illegal price fixing-so they waited for
Texas's Governor Sterling to act. 104
By August 16, Governor Sterling had seen enough; he declared
martial law and sent in the national guard and the Texas Rangers to stop

production and enforce whatever new limits the Railroad Commission
would set. 105 As this action raised prices, more and more Texans moved
to drill wells to take advantage of the price rebound and make sure they
won their share of oil before their neighbors' wells drained it from the
common reservoir.106 As a result, the Railroad Commission was forced
to keep cutting the daily allowable further and further.107 Its first
allowable level, in April, was 1,000 barrels per day, but that was struck
down by the courts.los Now, ignoring the court, with the Governor on
its side and boots on the ground, the Railroad Commission was
enforcing much stricter limits: when the troops let wells reopen, they
were limited to 225 barrels per day.09 Within a week, the Commission
cut allowables to 165 barrels per day.110 As more wells came online in
just three weeks, the Commission cut them further to 145 barrels to
keep the East Texas oil field's overall production at 1,000,000 barrels per

day, less than half of what the field had produced before Governor
Sterling sent in the troops.111

103 Id.; DAVIDS HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 82, at 185.
104 DAVIDS HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 82, at 181; Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of
Antitrust: An Interest-GroupPerspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985); Robert L. Bradley,
Jr., On the Origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 CATO J. 737 (1990).
105 DAVIDS HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 82, at 166-72; PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 31.
106 Cauble Smith, supra note 82.
107 LAWRENCE GOODWYN, TEXAS OIL, AMERICAN DREAMS: A STUDY OF THE TEXAS
INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS AND ROYALTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION 97-101 (1996) (describing the

Railroad Commission's use of allowables to manage statewide production); Coleman, supra note
6, at 411.
108 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 31.
109 Id.; CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 172.
110 CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 173.
111 Id. And, of course, a per-well allowable encouraged drilling more wells: twice the wells,
twice the allowable production per day. DAVIDS HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 82, at 187.
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Texas Rangers enforcing limits on East Texas oil production. Credit:
CLARK & HALBOUTY, THE LAST BOOM (1972).

J]

Of course, as the Railroad Commission optimized production
limits, and oil prices rose, there was even more reward for producing
more oil in violation of those limits. Despite the best efforts of the
national guard and the Rangers, this "hot oil"-oil produced beyond the
allowable limits-remained a huge problem.112 Then, on February 18,
1932, a federal court struck down Governor Sterling's imposition of
martial law and the limits he had imposed on oil production.113 The
Governor responded by appealing to the Supreme Court, claiming the

limits were being imposed by the Commission, not the troops, and
leaving most of the troops in place as roving "peace officers."114 The
Railroad Commission, for its part, responded by dropping allowables to
seventy-five barrels per day.115
The year 1932 proved to be a time of regulatory defiance as the
Commission issued nineteen new allowable orders, and the courts
struck each one down.116 Finally, in November, the legislature passed a

112 Id.; PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 31; D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Cartel Rents: The
Socony-Vacuum Story, 34 J.L. & ECON. 177, 184 n.20 (1991) ("The highest estimate of hot oil
production puts it at nearly 10 percent of domestic production in July 1934.").
113 Constantin v. Smith, 57 F.2d 227 (E.D. Tex. 1932).
114 CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 183-85.
115 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 31.
116 CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 184.
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law explicitly allowing the Commission to cut production to raise
prices.117 When the Supreme Court finally upheld the ruling against
martial law in December,118 more of the troops left, but a few stayed to
support the new Railroad Commission mandates, which were getting
even more organized support from local industry.119 Finally, in
February of 1934, the courts approved the Railroad Commission's new
authority, and its ability to enforce limits was secure.120
As Texas began to control its oil production, which accounted for
forty percent of U.S. production, the federal government began
encouraging other states to cooperate. First, relying on his authority
under the newly-passed National Industrial Recovery Act,121 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order banning interstate
transportation of hot oil-that is, oil produced in violation of state
allowable limits.122 The National Industrial Recovery Act was struck

down by the Supreme Court in 1935,123 but just a month later the U.S.
Congress passed a parallel law banning hot oil, the Connally Oil Act,

almost universally known as the Connally Hot Oil Act.124 By the same
Act, Congress authorized the states to coordinate their restrictions
through a new interstate compact: the Interstate Oil Compact

Commission.125

117 Id. at 187 ("After a bitter fight, and by a close vote, a market demand bill was passed on
November 12, 1932."); DAVIDS HINTON & OLIEN, supra note 82, at 188; 1932 TEX. GEN. & SPEC.

LAWS 3.
118 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 403-04 (1932) ("[T]here was no military necessity
which, from any point of view, could be taken to justify the action of the Governor in attempting
to limit complainants' oil production, otherwise lawful."). In the meantime, the Supreme Court
upheld Oklahoma's restrictions on oil output. Champlin Refin. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla.,
286 U.S. 210, 232 (1932).
119 CLARK & HALBOUTY, supra note 87, at 186-89.

120 Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 5 F. Supp. 633, 639 (E.D. Tex. 1934)
(noting that "all agree that a restriction to some extent is essential" and rejecting suggestion that
the Commission was unlawfully doing bidding of the New Deal era federal government, under
President Roosevelt, which supported state restrictions). On the series of lawsuits regarding New
Deal legislation, see ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF
A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 115 (1941).

121 National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 15 U.S.C. § 703
(repealed 1935).
122 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 36-37.
123 Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
124 Connally Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. § 715 (2018); PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 38-39; ROBERT
0. ANDERSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 300 (1984); Spence & Prentice,
supra note 43, at 184-85.
125 Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 138; YERGIN, supra note 3, at 239-40. The idea for the
commission had been laid out in a book by Northcutt Ely of the United States Department of
Interior, who later became a renowned scholar of international law, conservation, and oil and
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The Compact Commission proved to be one of economic history's
most important regulatory innovations. It allowed the independent
states to coordinate production cuts to ensure they received maximum
value for their oil and gas. 126 During its prime, from 1935 to 1953, the
United States produced sixty percent of world oil, at times as much as
seventy percent,1 27 powering the recovery from the Great Depression,
the Allies' victory in World War II, and the post-war economic boom.128
Working with federal experts from the Bureau of Mines, the compact
129
states agreed on production levels for each state. The individual states
then set production levels for each well in the state by taking that overall
level of production and then allocating it among oil fields and then, in
turn, individual wells.30 Texas was the dominant player in the Compact

gas. NORTHCUTT ELY, OIL CONSERVATION THROUGH INTERSTATE AGREEMENT (1933); see also

Owen L. Anderson, Foreword: The Evolution of Oil and Gas Conservation Law and the Rise of
Unconventional Hydrocarbon Production,68 ARK. L. REV. 231 (2015) (describing earlier efforts
at interstate coordination and the eventual development of the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission).
126 WALLACE F. LOVEJOY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION

REGULATION 33-36 (2013) (describing the development of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
Commission from the Oil States Advisory Committee and noting that "[t]he heart of the
immediate emergency program was the limiting of production by the states").
127 See supra note 91. Had the Compact Commission been in force earlier it could have won
America further benefits, because the United States dominated production from 1901 on. By
1928, "the United States produced 68% of the world's total .... " Marshall & Meyers, supra note
4, at 33 n.2 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, WORLD'S PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM IN

1930, ANNUAL PETROLEUM STATES 75A (1930)). By-1932, the United States still "produce[d] 62%
of the total supply of the world." Ford, supra note 4, at 1170 n.1.
128 Coleman, supra note 6, at 407-08 (summarizing sources describing why World War II
"was the first war fought for oil and determined by oil"); Feis, supra note 94, at 1175-81
(describing the efforts of the United States and United Kingdom to develop oil reserves abroad
to power the post-war expansion); John C. Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE
L.J. 1207, 1207 (1948) ("In less than a century, petroleum has changed from 'a peculiar liquid not
necessary nor indeed suitable for the common use of man' to a substance indispensable to the
military security and economic prosperity of a modern nation." (quoting Hail v. Reed, 54 Ky.
479, 490 (Ky. 1854))); Rex G. Baker & Erwin N. Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A
Correspondence, 64 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1951) ("Both in peace and in war the country must
have and is very dependent upon oil and gas. Our civilian economy and the national safety would
be jeopardized if we failed to maintain adequate reserves of petroleum .... ").
129 Ely, supra note 92, at 1214-17 (describing the development and operation of the Compact
Commission and noting that although there was no formal commitment to abide by production
allocations, "the compacting states have done so, within reasonable limits"); YERGIN, supra note
3, at 239-40; Williams, supra note 97, at 1160-63 (describing how these limits were set in
cooperation with the federal Bureau of Mines and supported by the oil industry).
130 Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 387 S.W.2d 35, 38 (1965) (state, field, well); JOHN S.
LOWE, OWEN L. ANDERSON, ERNEST E. SMITH, DAVID E. PIERCE, CHRISTOPHER S. KULANDER, &.
MONIKA U. EHRMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 758-59 (7° ed. 2018); David

Edward Pierce, CoordinatedReservoir Development-An Alternative to the Rule of Capturefor
the Ownership and Development of Oil and Gas, 4 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1, 16-17 (1983).
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Commission because it produced forty-one percent of U.S. oil during
this period. 131
When the center of oil production shifted to the Middle East in the

1960s, its new energy powers realized that they too must coordinate to
maximize their oil riches.132 Naturally they turned to the model of the
Interstate Oil Compact Commission.133 The organization they formed,
OPEC, would dominate the global economy for the next half century.
B.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was
formed in 1960, just as oil production from the Middle East was
beginning to rapidly surpass the established sources in the United
States.134 The year 1953 was the first in the twentieth century in which
the United States produced less than half of the world's oil.135 By 1965,
the Middle Eastern countries together produced more oil than the
United States.136 By 1973, the year of the great "Arab oil embargo,"137
the United States produced less than a sixth of the world's oil, dwarfed
by OPEC, which produced forty-six percent. 138 Since then, OPEC's

131 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 71 (Texas production reached forty-five percent of U.S.
production by 1953.). For data sources, see supra note 91.
132 In recent years, commentators have sometimes expressed concern that a large endowment
of natural resources might be an affirmative hindrance to development. See generally Robert
Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528 (2008)
(reviewing RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2007);
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); SASKIA SESSEN, TERRITORY,
AUTHORITY RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,

MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006)). But there is no consensus on whether oil or other
resources have this effect, and the United States' rise to prominence, driven by oil, is a strong
counterexample. Frankel, supra note 58, at 6-7.
133 Gilbert Burck, A Strange New Plan for World Oil, FORTUNE, Aug. 1959, 94, 94 (describing
plan for OPEC as "a kind of international Texas Railroad Commission"); YERGIN, supra note 3,
at 259; McNally, supra note 77, at 2 ("OPEC effectively took control of pricing and supply from
the commission and the Seven Sisters [oil companies] during the 1970s.").
134 YERGIN, supra note 3, at 522; Baghdad Parley Approves Permanent Organization; Caracas
Talks Scheduled, PLATI'S OILGRAM NEWS SERV., Sept. 16, 1960 ("Arab-Iranian-Venezuelan oil
price conference here ended late yesterday with unanimous agreement on series of decisionsincluding formation of coordinating organization to include four Middle East states and
Venezuela."); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2006 309 tbl. 11.5 (2007).
135 ETEMAD & LUCIANI, supra note 91.
136 Coleman, supra note 6, at 408; Note, From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the
Middle East Oil Industry, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV 774, 788-89 (1973).
137 There was an earlier failed embargo by the Middle Eastern oil exporters during the SixDays War in 1967. YERGIN, supra note 3, at 555-58.

138 ETEMAD & LUCIANI, supra note 91; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2006 ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. ANN. ENERGY REV. 309 tbl. 11.5.
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decisions have been the single biggest factor in determining the world
oil prices that shape the global economy.1 39
In the 1973 oil crisis the Middle Eastern OPEC countries cut

overall production, embargoed exports to nations that they perceived as

-

supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War, and dramatically
demonstrated the power of OPEC's oil dominance.140 In the years
leading up to 1973, Texas and the other American oil-producing states
had given up on using allowables to ensure higher prices-they no
longer had market power in a market dominated by OPEC.141 States still
set allowables, but they were simply set at a level to protect common oil
142
and gas reservoirs and thus ensure maximum ultimate recovery. They
3
were not ratcheted down further to raise prices.14 And of course, higher
prices would no longer have served the national interest, because in the
late 1940s the United States had become a net oil importer for the first
time in modern history.144 As a result, by 1973, when oil prices rose, the
American states had no "spare capacity" to respond-that is, they could
not ramp up production any further without damaging their oil
reservoirs, which would lower their ultimate recovery of oil.145 Without
spare capacity, America was helpless to watch the oil crisis unfold.
When the Middle Eastern oil powers cut their production by less
than a quarter, oil prices jumped sevenfold.146 It was a complete triumph
for OPEC, which found it had the same dizzying power the Railroad
Commission had once exercised: it could cut its production, lowering
its costs and extending the life of its oil reservoirs, while increasing its

139 M.A. ADELMAN, GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE: WORLD OIL SINCE 1970 (1995) 141-86.

140 ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 58. YERGIN, supra note 3, at 606-62.
141 PRINDLE, supra note 86, at 112. During this period, the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission retreated to its modern form as a forum for regulatory exchange. See Hannah J.
Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1700-01 (2014) (describing the Compact
Commission's work on fracking regulation and how it is used by states such as Texas).
142 Coleman, supra note 6, at 410-11; Colby, supra note 41, at 369'. Northcutt Ely presciently
predicted this day would come in 1940. Ely, supra note 84, at 1073 ("To date, the optimum rate
has nearly always been less than the market demand rate, so that a statute restricting production
to the market demand has automatically produced some, if not all, of the benefits which would
have been reached by laws restricting production to the rate calculated to produce maximum
ultimate recovery.").
143 PRINDLE, supra note 82, at 112; YERGIN, supra note 3, at 567-68.
144 NEELESH NERURKAR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42465, U.S. OIL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1
(2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42465.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2AQ-46X5}; YERGIN, supra
note 3, at 772 ("Oil imports have been a political and strategic concern since the United States
moved from being an oil exporter to an oil importer in the late 1940s.").
145 YERGIN, supra note 3, at 664.
146 Id. at 614-15 (showing that production decreased from 20.8 million barrels per day to 15.8
million barrels per day, but oil prices rose 600 percent).
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cash flow by making the world pay higher prices.147 And it ushered in
decades of OPEC-managed oil prices, in which higher energy prices
stunted global growth, leaving the world to plead for more
production. 148
Since 1973, OPEC's decisions on production have shaped global oil
markets. For example, when global oil discoveries swamped the markets

in the 1980s, OPEC cut its production to ensure that oil prices did not
crash.149 Again, when oil prices plummeted following the 2008 global
financial crisis, OPEC cut its production, doubling world oil prices.150
Of course, the rest of the world, dependent on oil imports, has tried
to resist OPEC's market power, banding together and working to reduce
their energy consumption.151 Yet none of these efforts have changed the
fundamental reality that oil prices continue to shape the economy,
which uses more oil every year.1 52 Finally, in the new century, the United
States found the key to breaking OPEC's dominance: its own flood of
crude oil.153 The fracking boom is the biggest oil boom that the world
has ever seen, and it may either break OPEC or forge a new alliance
between the United States and the world's other energy powers. 154
The American boom dramatically decreased OPEC's market share,
limiting its market power.1 55 OPEC's share of world oil production,
which had at times been nearly half, fell to thirty-four percent by 2012
and thirty percent by 2019.156 As OPEC's market share fell, its

&

147 Id.; ROBERT MCNALLY, CRUDE VOLATILITY: THE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF BOOMBUST OIL PRICES 131-32 (2d ed. 2019).
148 McNally, supra note 77, at 2-3; SMIL, supra note 1, at 346-47. See generally BRUNO
SACHS, supra note 1.
149 McNally, supra note 77, at 5; YERGIN, supra note 3, at 750-64.
150 McNally, supra note 77, at 5.
151 See SMIL, supra note 1, at 366 (describing formation of the International Energy Agency to
increase energy efficiency and combat OPEC); YERGIN, supra note 3, at 612; PHILLIP BROWN,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN FOCUS, IF 11186, NO OIL PRODUCING AND EXPORTING CARTELS (NOPEC)

ACT OF 2019 (2019) (describing proposed bill to ban OPEC).
152 Despite efforts to reduce oil use, global demand for oil has doubled since 1971. INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND, 1971-2019 (2020), https://www.iea.org/

data-and-statistics/charts/world-oil-supply-and-demand-1971-2018
[https://perma.cc/G8PLVNZM]. Even the International Energy Agency, formed to reduce oil use and combat OPEC,
admits that oil demand will continue climbing for the foreseeable future. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY,
OIL 2020: FUEL REPORT-MARCH 2020 (2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-2020#keyfindings [https://perma.cc/TZA3-Y3FB].
153 Coleman & Klass, supra note 7, at 674-78.
154 Coleman, supra note 6, at 418-19, 419 n.165 (the U.S. oil boom alone is seven times the
biggest previous oil boom, which was in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s).
155 McNally, supra note 77, at 6-12.
156 Alex Lawler, OPEC's Market Share Sinks-And No Sign of Wavering on Supply Cuts,
REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2019, 5:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec-graphic/opecs-
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production cuts had less and less influence on global prices, and it
captured a smaller share of any price increase, decreasing its incentives
to restrict production.157 OPEC found a temporary solution to this
problem by working with Russia to form an alliance known as OPEC+,
which cooperated from January 1, 2017 until Russia abruptly withdrew
on March 6, 2020.158 With the breakup of OPEC+, we are entering a new
period of uncertainty for global oil supply, but one that presents a
unique opportunity for the United States and the global environment
to benefit from new three-way negotiations with Russia, Saudi Arabia,
and OPEC.159
C.

Nascent North American Cartels

North America is emerging from the biggest oil and gas boom the
world has ever seen. In fact, it is emerging from three simultaneous
booms that have raised North America to a completely unprecedented
level of oil and gas production.160 Most important has been the boom in
oil production enabled by directional drilling and hydraulic
fracturing-generally known as "fracking."161 Second, fracking has also

unlocked vast reserves of natural gas production that are set to soon
make the United States the world's number one exporter of liquefied
natural gas-gas that is cooled until it is liquid and shipped to gashungry nations in Europe and Asia.162 Third, Canadian oil production
is still rising as it produces more and more from its oil sands, extracting
163
heavy oil from sandy soils using steam or hot water.

4

market-share-sinks-and-no-sign-of-wavering-on-supply-cuts-idUSKCNVCOU
[https://perma.cc/7JA5-N5F4}.
157 See supra Section II.B.
158 Lawler, supra note 156; Gamal et al., supra note 63.
159 Gardner & Hiller, supra note 64.
160 James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357,
1366 (2014); Coleman, supra note 12, at 277-78.
161 See Coleman, supra note 6, at 418-21, 418 n.160 (explaining how fracking works and why
oil companies sometimes object to using the term "fracking"); Fenner L Stewart & Allan Ingelson,
Regulating Energy Innovation: US Responses to Hydraulic Fracturing, Wastewater Injection and
Induced Seismicity, 35 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. L. 109, 110 (2016) (explaining how modern fracking
process differs from previous similar processes).
162 Coleman, supra note 12, at 272-76.
163 CANADIAN ASS'N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, 2019 CRUDE OIL FORECAST, MARKETS AND

4-5 (2019), https://www.capp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/338843.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PCG3-EMZK]; CERI: Canadian Crude Oil Production to Rise Until 2025, OIL
& GAS J. (July 23, 2019), https://www.ogj.com/drilling-production/production-operations/
2 25
[https://perma.cc/
article/14036679/ceri-canadian-crude-oil-production-to-rise-until- 0
JDT9-4S5N] ("Canadian crude oil production is expected to continue to rise until 2025.").
TRANSPORTATION
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These booms have, at times, overwhelmed the ability of the
transportation system, as companies cannot build pipelines or ramp up

crude-by-rail fast enough to bring this flood of oil and gas to market.164
There is so little room in gas pipelines that producers in Texas, North
Dakota, and Canada often must simply flare their natural gas or pay

others to take it away. 165 And even oil can trade at a substantial discount
in regions where there are not yet enough pipelines to bring all the new
oil to market.166 Low prices in these transport-constrained local
markets have created growing economic pressure to adopt regulations
to slow oil and gas production until the pipeline system can catch up.
And these transport constraints have created temporary situations of
market power that nimble regulators can use to protect cash flow for
producers unable to get their products to market.
The clearest example is the province of Alberta. In recent years, it
has faced catastrophically low local oil prices because there are too few
pipelines connecting it with global oil markets.167 Even a small surplus
of oil over transport capacity means that oil producers must bid lower
and lower prices to secure a spot on the province's export pipelines.168
Making matters worse, Canadian oil is so heavy and viscous that it
needs to be diluted with lighter hydrocarbons to make it fluid enough

to be transported by pipeline.169 In late 2018, the cost of this diluent plus
pipeline transport was more than the value of a barrel of exported
Canadian oil-that is, rather than receiving money, Canadian
producers were having to pay people to take their oil away.170 In
164 Coleman, supra note 12, at 272-79.
165 Id. at 275-76; supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 168-70.
167 For some of the regulatory hurdles that have held up the Keystone XL pipeline and the
Trans Mountain pipeline, both designed to carry oil away from Alberta, see Coleman, supra note
68, at 135-45.
168 Ian Bickis, Pipeline Constraints to Cost Canadian Economy $10.7-billion in 2018:
Scotiabank, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/industry-news/energy-and-resources/pipeline-constraints-to-cost-economy- 107billion-in-2018-scotiabank/article38030883 [https://perma.cc/Z4GG-R68R]; Kelsey Hallahan,
Pipeline Constraints, Refinery Maintenance Push Western Canadian Crude Oil Prices Lower,
TODAY IN ENERGY (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37672
[https://perma.cc/MHZ8-W2K8].
169 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RES. SERV., R43128, OIL SANDS AND THE OIL SPILL
LIABILITY TRUST FUND: THE DEFINITION OF "OIL" AND RELATED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2017)

("Diluted bitumen (Dilbit) is bitumen that is blended with lighter hydrocarbons-typically
natural gas condensates-to create a lighter, less viscous, and more easily transportable
material.").
170 Dan Healing, Oilsands Bitumen Prices Are Actually in Negative Territory for the First Time
Ever, Analyst Says, FIN. POST (Oct. 12, 2018), https:/Ibusiness.financialpost.com/commodities/
energy/oilands-bitumen-prices-are-actually-in-negative-territory-analyst-calculates
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response, Alberta ordered all oil companies to cut their production back
8.7%.171 This curtailment was supported by many oil companies, and it
immediately raised oil prices, increasing their cash flow and profits.172
Alberta's example illustrates the surprisingly wide range of
situations where regulators can exercise market power. Alberta does not
have a monopoly in global oil markets; it produces under four percent
of the world's oil.173 But transport constraints mean that there is not a
single global oil market: Alberta does not have enough pipelines
connecting it to global markets so it is, to an extent, an isolated
market.174 Alberta's government controls production from a group of
oil companies that can exercise market power within their isolated
market if they work together. That is, Alberta can increase its producers'
profits by cutting their production, as its 2019 curtailment proved.
When Alberta cut production by just 8.7%, heavy oil prices in Alberta
[https://perma.cc/ZN66-X4JP] ("[P]rices being paid for Western Canadian oilsands bitumen
have fallen so far that many producers are losing money on every barrel sold into the spot
market."). Although less common than negative gas prices, oil prices do, at times turn negative,
as they have in some places following the March 2020 oil price collapse. Javier Blas & Sheela
Tobben, One Corner of U.S. Oil Market Has Already Seen Negative Oil Prices, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
27, 2020, 12:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-27/one-corner-of-u-soil-market-has-already-seen-negative-prices [https://perma.cc/Q9Z5-58ZN] (finding negative
oil prices in Wyoming).
(Dec. 3, 2018),
171 Province of Alberta Curtailment Rules, O.C. 375/2018
http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/orders/OrdersinCouncil/2018/1218/2018_375.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LE6F-FFKZ]; Oil Production Limit, ALBERTA, https://www.alberta.ca/oilproduction-limit.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HGX-UH8L]; Robert Tuttle & Kevin Orland, Alberta
Ready to Cut Oil Output to Ensure 'Survival Price' to Help Producers Through Oil Crash, FIN.

/

POST (Mar. 11, 2020), https://business.fmancialpost.com/commodities/energy/alberta-ready-tocut-oil-output-to-ensure-survival-price-to-help-producers-through-oil-crash [https://perma.cc/
6WYV-NPYG].
172 Rod Nickel, Canada's Oil Cuts Offer Lifeline to Producers but Create New Problems,
REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2019, 12:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-crudecurtailment/canadas-oil-cuts-offer-lifeline-to-producers-but-create-new-problemsidUSKCN1PA2FK [https://perma.cc/9W8M-2GCJ]. Natural gas producers have asked for a
similar system for gas. Action Needed To Avert Alberta Natural Gas Crisis, CEOs Say in Open
AM),
12:00
2019,
17,
(July
BULL.
OIL
DAILY
Kenney,
to
Letter
2
https://www.dailyoilbulletin.com/article/ 019/7/17/action-needed-to-avert-alberta-natural-gascrisis- [https://perma.cc/NX5M-PDUV].
173 Alberta produces 3.81 million barrels of oil per day. Oil Production Limit, supra note 171;
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY', supra note 152. The world now produces just over 100 million barrels of
oil per day. Dan Murtaugh, 100 Million Barrels: The World Hit a Daily Oil and Liquids Record,
2
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-1
100-million-barrels-the-world-hit-a-daily-oil-liquids-record [https://perma.cc/Y4Y7-PJ3C].
174 For a description of the unique challenges facing all forms of oil transportation out of
Alberta, see James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are Transforming
Industry Investment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested in Court, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 497, 51214 (2017). Fuel markets are also divided in many other ways that prevent oil from being an
undifferentiated commodity. James W. Coleman, Energy Competition: From Commodity to
Boutique and Back, 7 NEW DEVS. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 321, 321-23 (2019).
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tripled; enforcing a cartel to cut all companies' production drastically
increased those companies' cash flow.175
Alberta's isolation is somewhat unusual in oil markets because oil
can easily be transported by rail, truck, or ship. But it is commonplace
in natural gas markets because natural gas can only be moved by
pipeline or as liquefied natural gas.176 As a result there are many, many
jurisdictions that can exercise market power in isolated natural gas
markets around the world.177 Like Alberta, these jurisdictions could
reap an economic benefit from slowing their production of natural gas.
The two jurisdictions that currently have the most to gain from
slower natural gas production are Texas and North Dakota. Both states
are flaring vast amounts of natural gas, which means natural gas is
worth zero or less at the site of the wellu8-that is, it would cost more
to transport the gas to market than it would be worth once it got there.179

175 Dan Healing, Canadian Crude Prices Retain Strength as Alberta Production Cuts Kick In,
FIN. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/westerncanada-oil-prices-remain-strong-as-alberta-production-cutbacks-kick-in
[https://perma.cc/
C7GJ-JR86] (describing how announcing the cuts sent the price of oil from "the low teens" to
$40); Chris Varcoe, Oil Curtailment a 'Bitter Pill' That Should End in 2020, Says Kenney,
CALGARY HERALD (Jan. 2, 2020), https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/varcoe-olcurtailment-a-bitter-pill-that-should-end-in-2020-says-kenney
[https://perma.cc/FB9P-CX54]
(describing how curtailment brought barrels of Canadian oil $34 closer to world prices).
176 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 272-74.
177 Many of these jurisdictions, however, would not want to raise prices if all the locally
produced gas went to local consumers. The cartel would only be in the state interest if a
significant percentage went for export.
178 Permian Gas Flaring Reaches Yet Another High, RYSTAD ENERGY (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/permian-gas-flaring-reachesyet-another-high [https://perma.cc/28W7-VE9D]; Emily Geary & Steve Hanson, Natural Gas
Venting and FlaringIncreased in North Dakota and Texas in 2018, U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42195 [https://perma.cc/
D9CA-M949] ("The volume of U.S. natural gas that was reported as vented and flared reached
its highest average annual level .... "); Brian Scheid, With Permian Flaringon the Rise, Regulation
Remains Uncertain, S&P GLOB. PLATTS (Mar. 6, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.spglobal.com/
platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/030620-with-permian-flaring-on-the-riseregulation-remains-uncertain [https://perma.cc/5KXD-STT5] (flaring in the Permian has
"skyrocketed"; it has "roughly tripled in two years").
179 For this reason, a common trope of multiplying the quantity of flared gas by the gas price
in distant markets to report the monetary value of gas wasted is, at best, very misleading. See, e.g.,
Jon Goldstein, $1.5 Billion and Counting: "Real Time "Waste Ticker" Reveals Value of Publicly
Owned Gas That Private Companies Waste, ENV'T DEF. FUND (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2017/01/30/1-5-billion-and-counting-real-time-wasteticker-reveals-value-of-publicly-owned-gas-that-private-companies-waste
[https://perma.cc/
5YTH-9HNB] (multiplying flaring on public lands by gas price at Henry Hub); Rebecca Elliott,
In America's Hottest DrillingSpot, Vast Volumes of Gas Is Going Up in Smoke, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
29, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-americas-hottest-drilling-spot-vastvolumes-of-gas-go-up-in-smoke-1535535001 [https://perma.cc/F4KL-KUSG] ("[R]oughly $1
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In fact, at Texas's natural gas hub, the Waha hub, natural gas prices are
often negative-that is, even if producers invest in gathering lines to
take the gas from their wells to this local market, they will still have to
pay to have their gas taken away.180 As a result, Texas is considering
exercising its authority to cut production.181 And North Dakota's oil and

gas regulator, the North Dakota Industrial Commission, is considering
limiting production as well.182 These two states have an opportunity to
lead the way toward a renaissance of American state energy cartels.
million worth of natural gas is burned away every day, going to waste."). If you have a ton of
gravel blocking your driveway, the fact that it would be worth $10 to a construction company
across town does not mean that your pile is "worth" $10; instead, you will have to pay someone
to take it away because the cost of transporting it is greater than the value it will have at the place
it is needed. Flared gas is worth less than nothing-if it had value at the well, someone would pay
for it, and it would not be flared. New pipelines or stricter allowables can raise the value of gas at
the well, but in their absence large quantities of gas will be a waste product with negative value
to society that producers must flare or pay others to take away.
180 J. Robinson & Jack Winters, Permian Spot Gas Prices Test Record Low as Maintenance
Limits Midstream Capacity, S&P GLOBAL PLATTS (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:20 PM),
2 2
0 0-wahahttps://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/04
spot-gas-price-eyes-record-low-in-intraday-trading [https://perma.cc/Z53Q-783V] ("[N]atural
gas prices in West Texas tumbled to levels below minus $7/MMBtu ... ."); Spencer Jakab, Oil
Producers Are Setting Billions of Dollars on Fire, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-producers-are-setting-billions-of-dollars-on-fire-11578652210
[https://perma.cc/Z82E-4MP4] ("Last year the price of gas at the Waha Hub in Texas reached
negative four dollars per million British thermal units while gas in the other parts of the country
was around $2.50/MMBtu."); Scott DiSavino, Explainer: Why Are U.S. Natural Gas Prices in
Texas Below Zero?, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-natgaspipelines-flaring-explainer/explainer-why-are-u-s-natural-gas-prices-in-texas-below-zeroidUSKCN1RL2NL [https://perma.cc/PJ3N-3RHS] ("U.S. natural gas prices in West Texas have
been trading in negative territory for more than two weeks, largely due to a lack of pipeline space,
forcing some drillers to pay those with spare pipeline capacity to take unwanted gas."). Natural
gas prices have also been negative in Alberta. Geoffrey Morgan, Natural Gas Prices Are So Bad in
Alberta Producers Are Having to Pay Customers to Take It, FIN. POST (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/canadian-natural-gas-prices-enter-negativeterritory-amid-pipeline-outages [https://perma.cc/A5P2-XKH4] (describing why natural gas
prices, for the first time, have started turning negative).
181 Rebecca Elliott, Texas Weighs Curtailing Oil Production for First Time in Decades, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-weighs-curtailing-oilproduction-for-first-time-in-decades-11584646724 [https://perma.cc/N6UH-JCCM]; Gardner
& Hiller, supra note 159 (statement of Railroad Commissioner Ryan Sitton) ("[P]roduction limits
could be implemented quickly, though no one who works at the agency was around the last time
the state limited production, in the early 1970s."); Mike Lee, Texas Grapples with How to Fight
Oil Crash, E&E NEWS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2020/03/27/stories/
1062710491 [https://perma.cc/76ZA-EBNK] (describing divisions between commissioners and
candidates for commissioner in approaches to production cuts).
182 Brian Scheid, North Dakota Weighs Plan to Keep Some Bakken Crude Off Market, S&P
GLOBAL PLATTS (Mar. 18, 2020), https:// www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latestnews/natural-gas/031820-north-dakota-weighs-plan-to-keep-some-bakken-crude-off-market
[https://perma.cc/2NFH-QLLQ] ("[T]he North Dakota Industrial Commission next week will
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U.S. ENERGY CARTELS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The Railroad Commission of Texas and North Dakota's Industrial
Commission should both ratchet down allowable limits of gas
production to raise natural gas prices above zero in oil fields like the
Permian Basin and Bakken Formation that do not have enough
pipelines to carry natural gas to market. Because wells produce a mix of
oil and gas, this will also mean slowing oil production down, which will
also raise oil prices a bit. If properly calibrated, as in Alberta, these limits
should increase immediate cash flow for operators, while extending the
life of wells. The alternative methods of controlling flaring, such as
flaring prohibition or fees, could devastate the industry and be
environmentally counterproductive.
As long as wellhead natural gas prices are not lifted substantially
above zero, stricter limits should only slightly raise delivered prices of
natural gas to consumers. And it should benefit consumers by ensuring
a more durable and less volatile supply of natural gas. The Interstate Oil
and Gas Compact Commission can also work with Texas, North
Dakota, and other oil-producing states to limit this downside by
ensuring that production limits are coordinated and just enough to
limit flaring, which is a waste of gas with no benefit to consumers. The
overall goal should be to maximize the economic and environmental

benefits from the current boom.
The reinvigorated Compact Commission can also work with the
federal government to secure cooperation from other major energy
exporters, such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of OPEC. These oil
and gas exporters have a shared interest in restraining production to
achieve higher energy prices. Slowing global production of oil and gas
will also slow emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants
emitted by combustion of fossil fuels. This is a rare opportunity where
the economic interests of key fossil fuel producers coincide with global

efforts to slow carbon emissions.183 It should be seized.

consider new rules aimed at preventing operators from either bringing more unwanted crude
onto the market or abandoning wells completely.").
183 In general, the economic interest of oil-producing countries, may be opposed to climate
regulation. Monika U. Ehrman, A Callfor Energy Realism: When Immanuel Kant Met the Keep
It in the Ground Movement, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 435, 463-67 (describing benefits to United States
of continued robust oil and gas production); James W. Coleman, UnilateralClimate Regulation,
38 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 87, 107-08 (2014).
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Reforming the Railroad Commission and the Compact
Commission

The Railroad Commission of Texas and North Dakota's Industrial
Commission should ratchet down gas production allowables for wells
in fields with abnormal flaring until flaring returns to normal levels.184
All these wells already have allowable limits, but they are generally set

above the level that any producer would reach.185 After 1973, the United
States was desperate to lower oil prices, and allowables were loosened
to the maximum that shared reservoirs could handle.186 And fracking
obviated the need to protect shared reservoirs because each fracked well
produced only the portion of the subsurface that had been fractured,
rather than drawing from a larger permeable, shared reservoir.187 Freed
of concern about price and shared reservoirs, for the past decade,
regulators have been setting allowables so high that they do not

184 The Railroad Commission has recently shown signs of being more open to limits on
flaring. Ryan Collins, Texas Oil Regulator Shifts Stance as Gas FlaringHits Record, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 7, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-07/texas-oil
(The
[https://perma.cc/JV65-JUTN]
regulator-shifts-stance-as-gas-flaring-hits-record
Commission has never denied a permit to flare; those decisions are usually unanimous; the
Commission's chairman dissented from granting one to a company that, uniquely, was already
connected to a pipeline but claimed it would lose $146 if the permit was not granted; such permits
last up to 180 days.).
185 John McFarland, What Landowners Need to Know About Field Rules, OIL & GAS LAW.
BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/landowners-need-know-field-rules
[https://perma.cc/C6AU-632V] ("Although the Commission continues to adopt field rules that
provide for assignment of allowables to wells in the field-usually based on acreage assigned to
each well under the field rules-as a practical matter the allowable system no longer limits or
regulates the amount a well can produce.").
186 YERGIN, supra note 3, at 664.
187 Although simply pumping oil will not extract the oil in a neighbor's impermeable
formation, there is a limited danger of pulling from a shared reservoir if there is "interference"
between the two neighboring wells. Bradley Olson, A Fracking Experiment Fails to Pump as
Predicted, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-fracking[https://perma.cc/EDP9-2F2P]
experiment-fails-to-pump-as-predicted-11562232601
(describing problem of wells drilled "too close together"); Wei Yu, Yifei Xu, Ruud Weijermars,
Kan Wu, & Kamy Sepehrnoori, Impact of Well Interference on Shale Oil Production Performance:
A Numerical Model for Analyzing Pressure Response of FractureHits with Complex Geometries,
SOC. OF PETROLEUM ENG'RS (2017).
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constrain production.188 With the rise of flaring, and the collapse of oil
and gas prices, it is time to ratchet down allowables again.189

There will always be some flaring in exceptional circumstances
where safety or unforeseeable circumstances require it.190 But if
regulators reduce production enough that natural gas prices are no
longer negative at the well, industry will have an incentive to capture
natural gas and bring it to market to capture that value. Industry is
currently looking at many innovative ways of using natural gas,
including compressing or liquefying it on the spot as well as using it to
generate electricity for innovative purposes including bitcoin mining.191
Of course, fracked wells produce oil and gas together, so limits on
gas production will also ratchet down oil production.192 The
Commissions can limit this impact by allowing trading of gas allowables
between producers so that the producers who would most benefit from
maintaining current production could do so. Trading would let
producers who cannot cut their gas production without cutting oil to
purchase gas allowables from companies that can cut their gas
production more easily.193 Alberta successfully used this kind of trading
to increase the benefits of its oil production limits.194

The collateral impact of gas limits on oil production may slightly
reduce revenue from oil. On one hand, reduced oil production will raise
field oil prices when they are priced below world market levels because

188 McFarland, supra note 185 ("The allowable system for gas has been 'suspended' by the
Commission for many years, so gas wells can always produce at their maximum rate. And the
field rules adopted for the fields in the new shale reservoirs usually set the allowable so high that
no well in the field can produce in excess of its allowable, except perhaps in the early months of
the well's production.").
189 Flared gas must, of course, count toward allowable production so that producers cannot
avoid the limits by flaring.
190 Eman A. Emam, Gas Flaringin Industry:An Overview, 57 PETROLEUM & COAL 532 (2015)
(describing three types of flaring, including "emergency flaring").
191 Anna Shiryaevskaya & Naureen S. Malik, A Way to Halt Natural Gas FlaringArrives on
the Back of a Truck, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-01-31/portable-lng-plants-arrive-at-natural-gas-wells-to-curb-flaring
[https://perma.cc/R576-NHRQ]; Naureen S. Malik, Why Bitcoin Mining Is Being Touted as a
Solution to Gas Flaring,BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6,2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-12-06/why-bitcoin-mining-is-being-touted-as-a-solution-to-gas-flaring
[https://perma.cc/6LZL-L7NL].
192 Coleman, supra note 12, at 275-76.
193 Companies that already have received long-term commitments from consumers to
purchase gas at positive prices would also likely purchase allowables from companies without
such hedges.
194 Robert Tuttle & Kevin Orland, Oil Companies Cash In by Not Pumping in Canada,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-26/
alberta-oil-cuts-spawn-new-market-in-trading-production-rights
[https://perma.cc/EZ2K8KJL].
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of transport constraints.195 But oil markets are better connected, so a
cartel of just Texas producers usually does not exercise oil market
power-that is, reducing all of Texas oil production usually will not
increase the cash flow of its companies enough to offset selling less

because the reduction will not have a big enough effect on world
prices.1 96
The Texas Railroad Commission and the North Dakota Industrial
Commission should start by mandating the modest level of reduction
that maximizes increased cash flow from natural gas subtracting the
reduced cash flow from oil.197 The Commissions could consider cutting

even a bit further to maximize ultimate value of oil recovered because
cutting further would reduce cash flow now but make the well produce
longer.198 Of course, a dollar now is worth more than a dollar later, but

Hotelling made clear that it is worth deferring sales if prices decrease
faster than the appropriate discount rate.1 99 There is no question that
natural gas, which is often worth less than zero at the well, will be worth
much more in the future.200 The current rock-bottom prices for oil
caused by the coronavirus mean that oil prices will also be much higher
in the future-suggesting that current oil cuts could maximize the longterm value of oil and gas wells.201 Finally, the Commissions should also
consider the costs to consumers and the benefits to the environment as
they determine how far to cut production beyond the level that would

maximize cash flow to producers.202
In the current coronavirus crisis, some oil companies have made
thus far unsuccessful attempts to convince state conservation
commissions to impose exactly these kind of production cuts. In Texas

195 Jeff Barron, Permian Region Crude Oil Prices Have Increased with Additional Pipeline
Takeaway Capacity, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=38832 [https://perma.cc/9F6S-Q867] (West Texas prices can be as much as
$20/barrel lower than Houston prices).
196 See supra Section II.C.
197 This balance will differ between different fields. For example, fields where both oil and gas
trade at a larger discount from coastal prices will maximize revenue through more aggressive cuts
than fields where only gas is constrained.
198 Like all companies and regulators, it would discount future cash flow to reflect the time
value of money.
199 Hotelling, supra note 55, at 139.
200 See infra Section III.E; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011: ARE WE
ENTERING A GOLDEN AGE FOR GAS? (2011).

201 Naureen S. Malik, Natural Gas Is Already in Contango-Brace for Super-Contango,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-06/
[https://perma.cc/7KSC-3V8V]
natural-gas-is-already-in-contango-brace-for-super-contango
(describing "steep discount" of current oil prices compared to future oil prices, a situation known
to the finance industry as "contango").
202 See infra Sections III.C-D.
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two oil companies, Parsley Energy and Pioneer Natural Resources,
unsuccessfully petitioned the Railroad Commission to cut oil
production twenty percent to mirror the fall in "reasonable market
demand" for oil.203 Similar petitions were considered in Oklahoma and

North Dakota.204 The Railroad Commission rejected the petition to
reduce production without a vote on May 5, 2020, suggesting it is not

yet ready to impose these controls.205 One issue is that, as in the 1930s,
the regulator may not yet have sufficiently complete and timely data to
enforce production limits.206 On the other hand, production data is now
much easier to access than it was in the past, so, given time and effort,
this is a surmountable problem.207
The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission should go back
to its roots and assist Texas and North Dakota by working with
neighboring states to moderate the pace of oil and gas development. The
re-invigorated Compact Commission would be particularly helpful
because the key flaring formations are both shared between two states:
Texas's Permian Basin extends into New Mexico, and North Dakota's
Bakken Formation extends into Montana.208
The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission could also
coordinate nationwide production of oil and gas. In 2017, the United

203 Proposed Order, Order Establishing the Reasonable Market Demand for Oil Production
in Texas, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/57506/final-conference-agenda-for-may-5-2020.pdf
TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046(a)(10) (defining production in excess of "reasonable market
demand" as "waste").
204 Jerry Bohnen, Decision Time Approaches for Oklahoma Regulators on Question of
Mandated Reduction of Produced Oil, OK ENERGY TODAY (May 10, 2020),
http://www.okenergytoday.com/2020/05/decision-time-approaches-for-okahoma-reguators[https://perma.cc/6C8V-CARN];
Tim
on-question-of-mandated-reduction-of-produced-oil
Olson, N.D. IndustrialCommission Holds Off on Oil Market Intervention, Considers FutureRelief
for Energy Sector, KXNET (Apr. 21, 2020, 2:28 PM), https://www.kxnet.com/news/local-news/nd-industrial-commission-holds-off-on-oil-market-intervention-considers-future-relief-forenergy-sector [https://perma.cc/FP3P-PY93].
205 Sergio Chapa, Texas Railroad Commission Rejects Statewide Oil Production Cuts, HOUS.
CHRON. (May 6, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/
Railroad-Commission-15247644.php [https://perma.cc/55T5-K5G5].
206 Anas Alhajji, History Tells Proration Would Cause Chaos in The Texas Oil Patch, FORBES
(Apr. 13, 2020, 10:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anasalhajji/2020/04/13/history-tellsproration-would-cause-chaos-in-the-texas-oil-patch/#e76b9b82e5f2
[https://perma.cc/M6D3XK8J].
207 In fact, oil companies now have remote data on wells' production that allows them to
throttle back production to respond to temporary price swings. Ryan Collins, Drillersin Biggest
U.S. Gas Play Get More Bang for Their Buck, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2017, 1:29 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-10/drillers-in-biggest-u-s-gas-play-getmore-bang-for-their-buck [https://perma.cc/J4F3-G3DM].
208 See Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 13, at 966.
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209
The United States is
States became a net exporter of natural gas.

projected to be the world's biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas in
the next five years because it has a vast supply of low-priced natural gas
coveted by Asian and European nations that often pay high prices for
clean-burning gas. 21O In theory, the United States would win more value
for its gas exports if it could husband its resources for higher price
periods.211 Implementing this theory, however, would require modest
and time-limited production controls; producing states would only be
likely to accept them if the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission
proved itself to be just such an adept, humble, and nimble force for
coordinating state regulation.
Similarly, if it proved capable, the Compact Commission could

prepare the United States for its future as an oil exporter. In December
212
If it joined OPEC
2018, the United States became a net oil exporter.

and Russia, together they would control sixty percent of global oil
production.213 If these countries worked together, they would have
more market power than any producing block since the heydays of the
Compact Commission when the United States alone produced sixty
percent of the world's oil.214

B.

Other Approaches to Reducing FlaringWill Not Work

State cartels are the best solution to flaring because the most
commonly proposed alternative solutions have serious economic and
environmental downsides. The most simple-minded solution-simply
forbidding flaring-would prevent many new oil wells and create
persistently negative natural gas prices that would devastate an already
215
stressed oil industry and cause cascading releases of greenhouse gas.
209 Terry Yen, The United States Is Expected to Export More Energy Than It Imports by 2020,
EIA: TODAY IN ENERGY (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38152
[https://perma.cc/KRD9-RW8C].
210 Kasumu et al., supra note 72, at 1739.
211 See supra Section I.B.
212 Blas, supra note 7.
213 Lawler, supra note 156.
214 See supra Section II.A.
215 If the Railroad Commission does place new limits on new flaring permits, it should make
clear that its actions are extraordinary to activate force majeure clauses in leases and loan
agreements, ensuring that oil and gas companies are not unduly harmed by loss of their permit.
See Bret Wells, Please Give Us One More Oil Boom-I Promise Not to Screw It Up This Time: The
Broken Promiseof Casinghead Gas Flaringin the Eagle Ford Shale, 9 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY
L. 319, 349-50 (2014) (describing why flaring limits may constitute force majeure); J. Denson
Smith, Impossibility of Performanceas an Excuse in FrenchLaw: The Doctrine of Force Majeure,
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Persistently negative natural gas prices would create an affirmative
incentive to flare, vent, and leak throughout the natural gas supply
chain, a cascade of greenhouse gas emissions that would be even harder

for regulators to control.
If oil companies cannot flare gas, they cannot drill for oil until they
have built "gathering" lines that connect their proposed well to a larger
pipeline that can carry it to market.216 Not only will oil companies have
to invest in gathering lines; when they get to market, they will have to
actually pay other companies to take their gas away.217 It makes no sense
to force companies to invest in delivering a product with a negative
price-the negative sign of the price indicates that it is a waste
substance, the production of which harms society.218 Worse yet, as
companies with oil wells are forced to deliver more and more gas to
market hubs, the price of gas will become more and more negative as
companies struggle to find someone willing to take the gas away.
Simple limits on flaring could also be environmentally
counterproductive because persistently negative natural gas prices
would encourage flaring, or worse, methane leaking, throughout the
natural gas supply chain.219 And leaking is even worse for the global
climate than flaring because methane is twenty-five times worse for the
climate than carbon dioxide.220 Low gas prices give companies
insufficient incentive to control flaring, leaking, and venting; negative

prices make matters much, much worse. Every link in the chain, from
well operators to gathering lines to processing plants to pipelines, would
have an incentive to intentionally or accidentally leak or flare the gas
rather than pay someone to take it off their hands.221

45 YALE L.J. 452, 453 (1936) ("Governmental acts and regulations by both the national and local
authorities have been held to constitute force majeure....").
216 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 13, at 1003; see also id. at 955 (defining "gathering" lines).
217 See supra note 180.
218 HEINZ KURZ & NERI SALVADORI, INTERPRETING CLASSICAL ECONOMICS: STUDIES IN
LONG-PERIOD ANALYSIS 230 (1st ed. 2007); MELISSA L. RORIE, THE HANDBOOK OF WHITE-

COLLAR CRIME 478 (1st ed. 2019) ("Waste is a product that has a negative value attached to it.");
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The
Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 27 (1987) ("[F]laring sometimes is
the use of natural gas tht [sic] most benefits society, and a no-flare order in such circumstances
is itself wasteful").
219 See Kevin Crowley, Permian's Gas-FlaringIs Much Worse Than Previously Thought,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-11/
permian-s-gas-burning-black-eye-is-30-worse-than-thought
[https://perma.cc/RS85-KR6A]
(reporting that, with too much gas production, flaring was happening not just at the wellhead
but also at processing plants, which added thirty percent to wellhead flaring numbers).
220 JASON BORDOFF & JOHN LARSEN, COLUM. CTR. ON GLOB. ENERGY POL'Y, US CARBON TAX
DESIGN: OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 22 tbl. 1 (2018).

221 Crowley, supra note 219.
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Of course, most of the parties in the gas supply chain are already
subject to regulations that limit leaks and flaring, and enforcement

could be stepped up, but gas leakage is already a knotty challenge for
companies and regulators because a colorless, odorless gas is so hard to
monitor. 222 Negative natural gas prices would destroy any incentive for
companies to monitor and would turn a regulator's job into an endless
and unnecessary game of whack-a-mole with recalcitrant companies.
More moderate solutions, like banning only new flaring, or merely
penalizing or taxing flaring, present the same environmental and
economic problems in somewhat mitigated form. Production limits, by
contrast, can attack both problems-flaring and leaking. Natural gas
prices above zero will give the industry an incentive to capture, control,
and sell all the gas that comes out of the ground. As venting and flaring

tapers off, regulators can focus enforcement efforts on a smaller number
of bad actors that are negligently wasting gas.
C.

Limiting Harm to Oil and Gas Consumers

The Railroad Commission of Texas and the North Dakota
Industrial Commission should start with modest limits and implement
them gradually to ensure that higher natural gas prices do not harm
consumers or pipeline companies. Consumers do not receive any
benefit from natural gas that is flared and society as a whole loses out
when a company is forced to produce a negative-value product. But
raising natural gas prices too far above zero could harm end-use
consumers by raising the cost of the gas they ultimately receive. It could
also harm pipeline companies by eroding the geographic price
differentials that allow them to profit from transporting gas. Raising
prices too much could also disrupt anticipated investments in local
processing and use of gas.223 At the same time, both consumers and
transport companies will benefit if production limits can ensure them a
longer-term supply of gas at more stable, but still low, prices.
To that end, the Railroad Commission and the Industrial
Commission should not raise Permian and Bakken gas prices to

222 Mike Lee & Carlos Anchondo, EPA May Roll Back Methane Rules. Will States Fillthe Gap?,
E&E NEWS (Aug. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/TN4D-AJJE (describing federal rollback of
methane standards and noting that the two biggest oil producing states, Texas and North Dakota,
do not have methane regulations).
223 Brandon Evans & Richard Frey, Analysis: Bakken Looks to Add 350 MMcf/d of Natural Gas
PM),
9:07
24, 2019,
Year-End, S&P GLOBAL PLATTs (Oct.
Processing by
102119-analysishttps://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/
bakken-looks-to-add-445-mmcf-d-of-natural-gas-processing-before-years-end
[https://perma.cc/Y7H7-Z9LQ].
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anything approaching the value of natural gas at the United States' main
natural gas market-the Henry Hub in Louisiana.224 And the
commissions must ensure that they do not artificially erase the
differential between Henry Hub and West Texas and North Dakota
prices so that there is still enough of a difference to encourage pipeline
investment to bring this flood of gas to market. One lesson of the
Alberta oil curtailment is that too rapid cuts can harm transport
investment-Alberta later had to reduce its curtailment to correct this
initial mistake.225 Texas and North Dakota should heed this lesson.
Consumers and transport companies may actually benefit if supply
restrictions ensure a longer-term supply at more predictable, if initially
somewhat higher, prices.226 Every time that a company builds a new
factory or refinery that requires natural gas, it is making a bet on a longterm supply of affordable natural gas. The same goes for any developer
that builds a new home with natural gas heating and any company that
builds a new natural gas pipeline. Production limits that reduce flaring
of natural gas help ensure that these customers have a long-term supply
of affordable gas by conserving natural gas for the future.
D.

Slowing CarbonEmissions From Oil and Gas

State cartels and a Hotelling approach to oil and gas production
will slow the release of carbon dioxide that comes from burning fossil
fuels.227 To maximize the long-term value of oil and gas, a coordinated

224 Q&A: What Is a Gas Trading Hub, and How Are They Established?, REUTERS (Dec. 29,
2017, 2:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-gas-exchange-q-a/qa-what-is-a-gastrading-hub-and-how-are-they-established-idUSKBNENOI1
[https://perma.cc/2VJU-25ZZ]
("The world's biggest natural gas hub is the Henry Hub in the U.S. state of Louisiana.").
225 Memorandum from Grant Bishop, Assoc. Dir. of Rsch., C.D. Howe Inst., to Sonya Savage,
Alberta Minister of Energy, C.D. Howe Inst., Finding the Exit Door for Alberta's Crude Oil
Curtailment (Sept. 19, 2019); Global Economics: Scotiabank Commodity Price Index,
SCOTIABANK 3, https://www.scotiabank.com/content/dam/scotiabank/sub-brands/scotiabankeconomics/english/documents/commodity-price-index/SCPI_2019-04-30.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MTY-389C] (explaining why "[f]ine-tuning production balances in an
attempt to achieve not-too-hot-not-too-cold differentials is slow, finicky work").
226 Kiah Collier, Pipeline Giant Sues Railroad Commission, Alleging Lax Oversight of Natural
Gas Flaring, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 3, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/12/03/
railroad-commission-sued-lax-oversight-natural-gas-flaring [https://perma.cc/3LZ6-9KS4] ("A
major pipeline operator is suing the Texas Railroad Commission-the state agency that regulates
oil and gas drilling-alleging that it has blatantly disregarded longstanding state law that restricts
the controversial and growing practice of burning off natural gas.").
227 Indeed, the release of carbon dioxide and its accompanying energy is the entire point of
burning fossil fuels. JAMES G. SPEIGHT, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL HYDROCARBON PROCESSES

421 (2d ed. 2019) (combustion of hydrocarbons "produces carbon dioxide (C0 2), steam (H 20),
light, and heat").
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global oil cartel would try to restrict supply enough to ensure that prices
8
smoothly increase over time.22 This supply restriction would mean
that, for any period, less oil and gas will be sold than would be sold in a
market without collusion, limiting the greenhouse gases and other
pollutants that come from burning fossil fuels. For most of the world's
major oil exporters, these externalities are unpriced, so if they
coordinated to reduce production, their cooperation would produce a

substantial global benefit.229
Of course, if global oil producers believed that oil consumption
was going to rapidly fall to zero, there would be a much smaller benefit

from coordination. Producers still might want to maximize their profit
by artificially lowering prices to raise prices in the few years left to them.
So, a global oil cartel would still slow oil production a bit. But there

would be less value to its producers in saving oil for the future.230 But,
happily, oil producers do not believe that oil consumption will rapidly
decline. They see that oil consumption is higher than it has ever been,
and they continue to make investments based on their belief that oil use
23
will continue to rise. 1
As a result, if other policymakers believe that oil consumption will
fall quickly, they should urgently favor cartel formation now,
should
or
while oil producers still believe that oil consumption will rise. State
energy cartels are a fascinating example of a situation where differing
underlying beliefs can create a strong convergence on a policy
solution.232 The more oil that a producer cartel believes will be
consumed in the future, the more the cartel will cut production now.
And the less oil that climate regulators believe will be consumed in the

228 Hotelling, supra note 55, at 139.
229 Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal
Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENV'T. L. REV. 1, 18-23 (2018) (describing externalities from unpriced
emissions from burning oil produced on federal land).
230 Another way of putting the same insight is that the Hotelling rule suggests selling enough
so that prices rise with the growth rate of the economy. If developments suggest that the future
price will be lower, the rational response is to sell more quickly so that prices fall enough to leave
room to grow to that revised future price.
231 See supra note 152; Holly Ellyatt, Clean Energy and Climate Change Are HelpingBig Oil,
Goldman Sachs Says, CNBC (Apr. 3, 2019, 7:56 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/clean[https://perma.cc/
energy-and-climate-change-are-helping-big-oil-goldman-sachs-says.html
S7TQ-QRTZ] (describing oil companies' optimism for long-term continuation of "robust" and
"resilient" demand growth).
232 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 173940 (1995); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 385-95 (2d ed.
2005). But see T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1935) ("The last temptation is the
greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason.").
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future, the more important it is that oil producers cut now while they

still believe otherwise.
Even if a global oil cartel would only delay production to the future,
it would still have substantial benefits for climate protection. First,
economic harm from climate change is often tied to the pace rather than
the magnitude of warming, as communities around the world must
adjust to rapidly rising temperatures.233 Second, reducing current
emissions will buy us time to prepare for the worst consequences of
climate change.234 Third, in the meantime, higher oil prices will benefit
alternative energy sources and transportation technologies that could
permanently change the trajectory of global greenhouse gas
emissions.235
E.

Increasing the Environmental Benefits of NaturalGas

State energy cartels can also turn U.S. natural gas production from
an environmental liability to an environmental asset. Natural gas has no

environmental benefit if it is vented or flared: its energy is just wasted,
and it contributes to climate change by raising global concentrations of
methane and carbon dioxide.236 On the other hand, if slower drilling
means that gas can be shipped to markets that are currently dependent
on coal for power and oil for heat, it could have significant

environmental benefits.

237

Burning natural gas releases less greenhouse gas and drastically
less air pollution than burning oil or coal.238 And much of the world is

&

233 Richard S.J. Tol, The Damage Costs of Climate Change Toward More Comprehensive
Calculations, 5 ENV'T & RES. ECON. 353, 359 (1995) (explaining why "a large part of the damage
is attributed to the rate of climate change" rather than "absolute changes").
234 Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86
TEX. L. REv. 1655, 1697 (2008) (explaining the need to "buy time" to find solutions to climate
change)
235 Williams, supra note 97, at 1163 (explaining that "prorationing serves the ends of
conservation" because "[a] steady, reasonably high price.. . tends to encourage the use of
competing energy sources").
236 A. R. Brandt, G. A. Heath, E. A. Kort, F. O'Sullivan, G. Pdtron, S. M. Jordaan, P. Tans, J.
Wilcox, A. M. Gopstein, D. Arent, S. Wofsy, N. J. Brown, R. Bradley, G. D. Stucky, D. Eardley,
R. Harriss, Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas Systems, 343 SCIENCE 733, 734
(2014) ("LCA studies generally agree that replacing coal with [natural gas] has climate benefits.")
(also noting reasons that methane emissions are sometimes undercounted).
237 Sabouni et al., supra note 23, at 5428 (burning natural gas emits far less criteria pollutants
than burning coal-less than 0.04% the sulfur dioxide and 0.3% the particulate matter).
238 Paul Gilbert, Conor Walsh, Michael Traut, Uchenna Kesieme, Kayvan Pazouki, & Alan
Murphy, Assessment of FullLife-Cycle Air Emissions of Alternative Shipping Fuels, 172 J. CLEANER
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still dependent on oil and coal for heat and power. Coal is far and away
the world's leading source of electricity, responsible for thirty-eight
percent of global power. 239 And three percent of the world's power still
comes from oil, more than it gets from solar.240 Coal is particularly
dominant in Asian markets that are also most affected by debilitating
241
air pollution, and it is projected to continue rising in coming years.
Natural gas is a particularly good replacement for coal power because,
2
like coal and unlike solar and wind, it can produce power at any time.24
But, unlike coal, it can easily be ramped up and down, so that it allows
countries to incorporate more intermittent solar and wind power into
their electricity mix.243 As a result, U.S. natural gas could clean up the
air in developing countries around the globe.244
If natural gas from Texas and North Dakota can reach markets
around the world, it can also clean up home heating, which still often
depends on coal and heating oil. China is struggling to convert millions
of homes each year from coal heating to gas heating.245 Even in the
United States, many households in polluted cities on the Eastern
seaboard are dependent on dirtier sources such as heating oil.246 And
Europe too depends on heating oil, with some countries using it to heat
PROD. 855 (2018); James W. Coleman & Sarah Marie Jordaan, Clearing the Air: How Canadian
LNG Exports Could Help Meet World Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals, C.D. HOWE INST., EBRIEF 2 (2016), https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research papers/mixed/
e-brief_244.pdf [https://perma.cc/84WC-8MA8].
239 Int'l Energy Agency, World Gross Electricity Production By Source, 2017 (2019),
https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/world-gross-electricity-production-by-source2017 [https://perma.cc/3A7G-U4KK].
240

Id.

/

241 'Carlos FernAndez Alvarez, FadingFast in the US and Europe, Coal Still Reigns in Asia,
https://www.iea.org/commentaries/fading-fast-in-the-us-and-europe-coal-still-reigns-in-asia
(https://perma.cc/8JS9-6RSZ].
242 Coleman, supra note 12, at 270.
243 Coleman, supra note 68, at 148.
244 Environmental groups and fossil fuel executives have, at times, formed alliances on these
kinds of policies in the past, promoting natural gas power over coal. Felicity Barringer, Answering
4
for Taking a Driller's Cash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/1
science/earth/after-disclosure-of-sierra-clubs-gifts-from-gas-driller-a-roiling-debate.html
[https://perma.cc/4UT8-3QVE] (describing how Sierra Club took money from Chesapeake
Energy's top executive "from 2007 to 2010, for its Beyond Coal campaign to block new coal-fired
power plants and shutter old ones" and then "promoted natural gas as a cleaner 'bridge fuel' to a
low-carbon future").
245 China Expands Switch from Polluting Coal Heating in 2018: Environment Minister,
REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2019, 3:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament2
environment-gas/china-expands-switch-from-polluting-coal-heating-in- 018-environment[https://perma.cc/GUT2-FGMA].
minister-idUSKBNIQSOQB
246 Marcela Rourk, Winter Begins with Higher U.S. Heating Oil and Propane Prices, EIA:
TODAY IN ENERGY (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37432
[https://perma.cc/EZ6J-3KAF] ("[M]ost heating oil is consumed" in the U.S. "Northeast.").
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almost half of their homes.247 U.S. natural gas could replace these dirtier
systems around the world, but only if state energy cartels can coordinate
so that it is no longer flared at oil wells across the country.
CONCLUSION

The United States of America is emerging from history's biggest
oil boom, but it is wasting staggering amounts of natural gas and facing
an uncertain future of rock-bottom oil prices. Timely action by state
conservation commissions and a re-invigorated Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission can protect the oil industry's health and, more
importantly, conserve our resources for tomorrow's challenges. And the

federal government can leverage these actions to negotiate global
cooperation on oil production that will throw its producers a lifeline
and, at the same time, achieve unprecedentedly effective cooperation on
slowing climate change. Texas, North Dakota, the other oil states, and
the nation should move urgently and cooperatively to take this unique
opportunity to protect the nation's economy and the global
environment.
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